Thread: How many times have we already died?

Very interesting insight...but according to our research, our thought process occurs inside our brain, and our brain is encased within a thick-ass round bone, our skull. Not to mention that our brain cells never regenerate, so that means that our brain (and essentially our mind) have to be the same. However, even if we possibly could re-arrange our old atoms to their original state, sure, we would be there, excluding brain, and the contents within.

Like SomeGuy said. Brain cells don't regenerate and die much less than other cells in the body.

The body dies, but the mind stays constant.

I'm not sure if this has been coined before but here goes.

I've been doing some research lately about how humans apparently replace every cell in their bodies multiple times in the course of their lifetime. This process runs full circle every 6 years or so with every cell in the body.

That makes me think. Are we a completely separate consciousness from what we were ten years ago? Can we even technically be considered ourselves ten years ago? Do our old minds die off as time progresses to be replaced with more advanced psyches?

Since no matter can be created or destroyed, all the materials of your past being are still around, assimilated unto nature. If you took the atoms of your being exactly ten years ago and rearranged them in their exact positions, logically, you would get yourself...ten years ago. Since there is no connection between you and yourself, both consciousnesses would be separate inhabiting two fully functional organisms.

This raises a question: Are our past, present, and future selves separate consciousnesses replacing each other over time? What is consciousness? What creates this feeling of being ourselves throughout our lives though it has been proven we are not.? As I look back at my memories, I feel like I've existed for the past 15 years, I really do. Don't you?

I'm going to end it there. Really raises an interesting thought. What do you guys think?

I think conciousness is int he mind, not in the arms or the heart or whatever. So as long as our mind stays the same, we're good.

I dug a little deeper. Nevermind, lol. It was an interesting thought to dwell on, however. Really stimulated my mind.

The fact brains don't regenerate doesn't really brake your idea altogether. If the consciousness is not "supernatural" and if there is nothing our brains are made of which defines us specifically, then we can assume that changing the structure the brains will kill you, does it not? And if brain cells die all the time, wouldn't that get us back to your originall assumption that "you" have died before?

Originally Posted by Bonsay

The fact brains don't regenerate doesn't really brake your idea altogether. If the consciousness is not "supernatural" and if there is nothing our brains are made of which defines us specifically, then we can assume that changing the structure the brains will kill you, does it not? And if brain cells die all the time, wouldn't that get us back to your originall assumption that "you" have died before?

That would mean that we are dying as we live on. As our brains wear out and slowly die, we would lose knowledge and memories not even knowing that these things were fleeting from our minds. Maybe as time progresses, we are losing more and more of our consciousness.

Odd thing, I keep on looking and looking and I believe I found an article about an experiment studying brain cells came up with proof that adult brain cells do regenerate if they are lost. I have not found any sources that have stated they are naturally replaced overtime, however. I'll post a link if I can find it again. I'm having trouble with this information because some of the things I've read state that all body cells are replaced, not specifying that brain cells are not.

I'll be back later.

Originally Posted by ClassyElf

Like SomeGuy said. Brain cells don't regenerate and die much less than other cells in the body.

The body dies, but the mind stays constant.

That's not true on two accounts. First of all, brain cells do regenerate.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurogenesis

It has been found that neurogenesis does occur in the regions of the brain associated with learning and memory, ie. the seat of the soul.

Second, even if a cell doesn't get replaced, its atoms and molecules certainly do. So the atoms that make us up most certainly are replaced regularly. You cannot avoid this question.

I don't think the idea presented in the OP are far from the truth.

I am not who I was 10 years ago. Hell, I'm not even who I was 5 or 3 years ago. And I know for sure I won't be who I am now 5 or 10 years from now.

Hmm This makes you think, I'm not sure of the answer, but do you think that the soul could be just a illusion created by the brain? The brain is us, and if you change it you change us. When it dies you go poof? Its weird when we take information from our eyes and into our brain, our brain processes it and where does the info go? Where is the ultimate decision about how the data is interpreted made?

Originally Posted by SuperSmashcz

Hmm This makes you think, I'm not sure of the answer, but do you think that the soul could be just a illusion created by the brain? The brain is us, and if you change it you change us. When it dies you go poof? Its weird when we take information from our eyes and into our brain, our brain processes it and where does the info go? Where is the ultimate decision about how the data is interpreted made?

This all goes back to the Chinese Room and the Hard Problem of consciousness. But to whet your appetite, consider this: when you point at a river, are you pointing at a material thing? The water molecules are rushing by so fast that the entire material existence of the river before you is replaced every few seconds. So what, then, is a river? Answer that question and you'll also be well on your way to understanding what is and isn't the human mind.

Originally Posted by drewmandan

That's not true on two accounts. First of all, brain cells do regenerate.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurogenesis

It has been found that neurogenesis does occur in the regions of the brain associated with learning and memory, ie. the seat of the soul.

Second, even if a cell doesn't get replaced, its atoms and molecules certainly do. So the atoms that make us up most certainly are replaced regularly. You cannot avoid this question.

Thank you for that. Just what this thread needed.

A couple years ago, I read a very interesting article about human consciousness. They say our consciousness attaches itself to mundane human activities to make itself seem real. Even when you acquire this knowledge, the attitude will remain "Everyone is a zombie except for me". It's hard to state what creates consciousness. It's possible that all living things are conscious, but are limited to their intelligence. Maybe all living things aren't conscious, but once a certain level of intelligence is achieved, so is consciousness?

Originally Posted by Kushna Mufeed

I don't think the idea presented in the OP are far from the truth.

I am not who I was 10 years ago. Hell, I'm not even who I was 5 or 3 years ago. And I know for sure I won't be who I am now 5 or 10 years from now.

However, who you are know, is based off who you were 10 years ago. And who you will be in 3 to 5 years will be based off you are now.

People change. But I would not go as far as to say I died three times already over the course of 21 years. Not even close.

Originally Posted by blade5x

However, who you are know, is based off who you were 10 years ago. And who you will be in 3 to 5 years will be based off you are now.

People change. But I would not go as far as to say I died three times already over the course of 21 years. Not even close.

Well, yes. This is true.

In the sense that a Wii is based off a NES.

I wasn't agreeing that yes, I have died multiple times. It's just that whoever I was before no longer exists now.

Not every cell dies every six years. Your skeletal and nervous systems remain mostly unchanged through out your whole life.

You only exist when the brain cells interact with each other. If you created a clone brain would it mean that the originals owner would control both? Probably not. So if there is nothing in your brain that would attach a soul, then consciousness can only be an illusion. I see it as some sort of a virtually existing entity. "You" only exist when certain neurons fire. There is nothing tangible about consciousness, which is in fact thought. One neuron firing wouldn't produce it or at least it wouldn't produce the same result (which is to get a consciousness). Couldn't we widen this to more then one neuron and get to the point where there are just different versions of consciousnesses based on different arrangements of neurons, including minor ones? So one extra dead neuron would kill you, even if it wouldn't change the original consciousness that much. Maybe if one assumes this, you could go further and say that minor changes like, which neurons fire or how often, bring the same result. The new consciousness would think it's the old one and the same goes for others that see it.

Originally Posted by Black_Eagle

Thank you for that. Just what this thread needed.

A couple years ago, I read a very interesting article about human consciousness. They say our consciousness attaches itself to mundane human activities to make itself seem real. Even when you acquire this knowledge, the attitude will remain "Everyone is a zombie except for me". It's hard to state what creates consciousness. It's possible that all living things are conscious, but are limited to their intelligence. Maybe all living things aren't conscious, but once a certain level of intelligence is achieved, so is consciousness?

I personally believe that not only all living things, but all neural net architectures, including even "artificial" ones created in labs, are conscious. But, like you said, they are limited in intelligence. I can't comprehend there being a line between 'conscious' and 'unconscious'. What, you take the dumbest possible human, subtract one neuron, and now they're not conscious? How does that make sense?

Originally Posted by Xaqaria

Not every cell dies every six years. Your skeletal and nervous systems remain mostly unchanged through out your whole life.

You're missing the point. Even if the cells remain, the molecules certainly don't.

Consider the problem stated in another way: Imagine one day in the future a small computer is devised that can accurately mimic the activation patterns of a neuron. The computer is roughly the same size as a neuron and is given inputs and outputs that are compatible with human synapses. Now say this artificial neuron is implanted in a human brain, and replaces a biological one. Most of you would agree that this person is still human, and in fact, the same person. Now what if, later, another neuron is replaced? And then another, and another, etc., until all neurons are replaced. Is this still the same person?

Even better, what if every biological neuron that was taken out was implanted somewhere else in the same configuration? Are there now two versions of the same person? Where is the soul?

Originally Posted by drewmandan

And then another, and another, etc., until all neurons are replaced. Is this still the same person?

Even better, what if every biological neuron that was taken out was implanted somewhere else in the same configuration? Are there now two versions of the same person? Where is the soul?

If there is no magical soul that somehow stays the same and "follows you", then no. There would be two identical brains with identical consciousnesses and whatever comes along. The question I see from all this experimenting is, how long does a consciousness actually live?

Originally Posted by Bonsay

If there is no magical soul that somehow stays the same and "follows you", then no. There would be two identical brains with identical consciousnesses and whatever comes along. The question I see from all this experimenting is, how long does a consciousness actually live?

Even long after a river dries up, there are still probably dozens of water molecules following its course. How long does a river live?

Yes, the majority of people in this thread have the wrong end of the stick. The question is completely valid. Certainly the matter in our brains shifts about; the molecules that make up a cell aren't fixed in place, they will be recycled and ultimately leave the body at some point, to be replaced by new ones.

This is why fuctionalism is such a rock solid philosophy, even if morons like Searle would disagree with poorly constructed 'counter examples'. Functionalism states that what matters is not what something is made of, but the causal relationships between parts of a system.

To suggest the reverse is biological chauvinism, and it is absurd. For a start you are suggesting there is something inherently conscious about this:



But not this:



(Those are carbon and silicon atoms respectively).

Also you are suggesting that every time a new water molecule enters a neuron or an ion moves about, consciousness is destroyed and recreated. What exactly do you possibly mean by changing the molecules? What is a change? A little movement of one molecule? A movement of a large number of molecules at once? A chemical reaction between molecules? In any case, each of these things happens trillions of times per second in the brain, and to suggest that each one has an individual consciousness is therefore absurd.

It is therefore the system which is crucial to consciousness.

This I find fascinating though. There is not really supposed to be any such thing as a solid lump of matter in the universe; instead, reductionism holds that it is a collection of billions of little atoms. Concepts just generally aren't supposed to be real, and causality has no existence, it is just a product of laws. But functionalism shows us that actually it is these ideal concepts (solid objects, cells, nodes in a network) which create individual consciousnesses, which are completely distinct things. To me this suggests naturalism and reductionism may turn out to be completely flawed.

Cogito, ergo sum
(I think therefore I am.)

If we can comprehend our thoughts, we are conciouss of our being, no? I believe that the soul exists in our thoughts, not so much in our brain cells. The cells are not inherently conciouss of being cells. My thoughts, however, can be aware of thier own existance.

Yeah, it all pretty much depends on your definition. I believe that according to quantum mechanics you electrons have a chance of being all over the place, including a few miles away from you, or something. Also, no human can live without a bunch of different bacteria in his guts. OMGWTFBBQZ, I guess a 'human' is a conglomerate of different species. Or not.

Basically, biology just says "WHOOP DA WHOOP ME NIZZLE" and just draws arbirtairy lines. Yeah, probably 90% of your atoms are different from ten years ago. What does that say? Pie? Maybe it says 'Pie'. Lets keep it at that.

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edit:

In regards to Xei:

I believe searle is mostly know for his writings in opposition of 'Stong AI'. I think we can agree that 'Stong AI' is pretty much silly. Turning machines can't think. Neither can the desktop computers we have now. Searle might go a bit to far in his 'common-sense' philosophy against some of the theories of philosophy of mind. I certainly understand why he is accused of bio-chauvinism. However, I think Searle is right in saying it would take quite an impressive machine to have conciousness. A machine 'with the same causal powers of the brain' as he calls it. (note that he admits the brain is just a machine, and that there is nothing ultimately special about it that makes it unique in comparison to what humans can create.)

Basically, I agree that even if we could simulate a brain, by calculating the movement of every atom in a brain, for instance, it still wouldn't be concious. (I have to admit that a month ago I was biased to believing it would be some sort of concious..)

Anyhow. I do believe that there is no reason why a network of water-pipes or transistors that work exactly as the brain can produce conciousness. I think Searle would agree, more or less. However, I also have to admit that a brain made of beer-cans or GI-joe-dolls, as long as they operate exactly like neurons, could also cause conciousness. And Searle is a bit too bio-chauvinistic about this.

(And maybe something that works different as the brain also can produce conciousness, we just don´t know. We do know that something working like our brain would produce conciousness, since we have a brain to 'test it'.)

Functionalism, or a kind of it, is right in saying that in theory conciousness could exist in anything as long as it has the same functions (at neuron-level) as a brain.
Functionalism, or a kind of it, is wrong in saying everything behaving or functioning in certain ways, with certain functional mechanisms, is always concious. I believe there are, or have been, kind of functionalism that are almost behaviouristic in the sense that they wouldn't discriminate between a human being and a robot acting exactly in the same functional, for example pain-evading, ways. As far as I know the term 'functionalism' is used in a few different ways. And some of those ways are wrong.

Basically, some functionalists are really wrong. And Searle was and is pretty right in regards to arguing against certain theories of mind. But he isn't completely right in all aspects.

I agree that actually performing the function may not necessarily give consciousness. For example, if there was a hypothetical computer with every single conversation possible and the required responses on its hard drive, having a conversation with that computer would not make it conscious. However, functionalism as I understand it means that what is important is the system having special attributes that make that system conscious (I do not claim to know what such attributes would be, but they might be something like the system being a network), not the actual function of the system.

I actually completely support this form of functionalism in all respects.

The China brain would be conscious, for example. The fact that he thinks simply creating the analogy of the China brain disproves functionalism 'just because it would be really silly' in my opinion shows how blind Searle is. Negative charges whizzing round tiny lumps of mass and positive charge at the speed of light are allowed to make consciousness, but Chinamen performing exactly the same function are not? Why?? Pathetic argument in my eyes... barely even qualifies as any sort of proof at all.

Same with the China room. Of course the man doesn't understand the symbols. But neither do our individual neurons, or individual ions (all parts of the system) 'understand' the symbols. The system as a whole, however, does.

I don't understand your viewpoint though... tin cans or water pipes could be conscious; we agree there. But why not computers or turing machines? If Searle ever said that a turing machine is not capable then he is completely mistaken (again) as a Turing machine has infinite capacity for any algorithmic process, which nervous activity almost certainly is: and a computer is a physical object just like any other, surely (although the isomorphisms between transistors and nodes in a network are somewhat more convoluted they are still completely distinct)?

Originally Posted by Xei

I agree that actually performing the function may not necessarily give consciousness. For example, if there was a hypothetical computer with every single conversation possible and the required responses on its hard drive, having a conversation with that computer would not make it conscious. However, functionalism as I understand it means that what is important is the system having special attributes that make that system conscious (I do not claim to know what such attributes would be, but they might be something like the system being a network), not the actual function of the system.

I actually completely support this form of functionalism in all respects.

Yeah, I can live with that too.

The China brain would be conscious, for example. The fact that he thinks simply creating the analogy of the China brain disproves functionalism 'just because it would be really silly' in my opinion shows how blind Searle is. Negative charges whizzing round tiny lumps of mass and positive charge at the speed of light are allowed to make consciousness, but Chinamen performing exactly the same function are not? Why?? Pathetic argument in my eyes... barely even qualifies as any sort of proof at all.

You mean the Chinese-people-acting-as-neurons thingy? Yeah, I think Searle is pretty dogmatic on that point. Probably wrong. Searle also kind of shows he is wrong in his own test, where as a rebuttal of an argument against his Chinese room he make the guy-in-the-room, without knowing what the hell he is doing, control a bunch of water-pipes instead of putting Chinese signs in the out-box. Those water-pipes, since they exactly work as a brain, would produce the Chinese speech. Searle without noticing it there kind of proves he is somewhat bio-chauvinistic, at least when it comes to the consciousness of silly objects. Such as pipes or Chinamen.

I believe dennett also calls the Chinese room an 'intuition-pump', that is in the end completely wrong and relies completely on creating a false kind of intuition. He also, quite justly, says: Let the chinese room be put in the shoes of a single neuron, instead of the entire system. Would the system speak english? Yes. If the room acts just like a neuron, ofcourse. However, then you can replace all the neurons.

Then again, searle in his chinse-rooms text goes over this, calling it the 'many mansions reply'. He only puts it forward in regards to people saying "well, better, non one-operation-at-a-time computers in the future CAN produce conciousness!". Searle says the Chinse room argument was only an argument about turning- or normal-computer like conciousness. Or actually not even conciousness, but understanding.

The chinese-room-neuron does still has a place in a 'causally powerful' neural network. That's quite different from a turning machine.

Same with the China room. Of course the man doesn't understand the symbols. But neither do our individual neurons, or individual ions (all parts of the system) 'understand' the symbols. The system as a whole, however, does.

Searle actually goes into the 'the system as a whole' reply to his Chinese room. (in the text "Minds, Brains and Programs" (1980).) He says: What if I internalize the rule-book, the input/output-signals, and stand in a meadow. Everything of the Chinese-speaking system would be inside of me, and still I wouldn't be able to understand Chinese. And he has a good point. A chat-bot is perhaps a very simple kind of Chinese room. It doesn't know what it is saying. It is just working on "if input *letters* then output *letters*. Even the very complicated ones that take grammar or metaphors into regard, at the current level, nowhere near 'understand' the language they speak the way we understand it.

The chinese room can be pretty lame, indeed neurons also don't understand what they are doing. Still, originally the Chinese room was against the claimed intelligence 'symbol manipulating' programs. Searle has a good point when he claims that computers we know only have syntactics, no semantics. A computer 'speaks Chinese' or 'plays chess' only because we recognize it as such. The computer just sees 'squiggle squiggle is followed by squoggle squoggle'.

I don't understand your viewpoint though... tin cans or water pipes could be conscious; we agree there. But why not computers or turing machines? If Searle ever said that a Turing machine is not capable then he is completely mistaken (again) as a Turing machine has infinite capacity for any algorithmic process, which nervous activity almost certainly is: and a computer is a physical object just like any other, surely (although the isomorphisms between transistors and nodes in a network are somewhat more convoluted they are still completely distinct)?

I think a turing machine could simulate a brain perfectly. Meaning it could give the exact same answers as an actual brain would give. However, I think Seale has a point in saying simulation is not duplication. A turning machine, when simulating a brain, still only does 'if A then B'. It's following a set of rules, doing what it has to do one step at a time.

Tin cans or whatever, in a giant network, just like neurons, do have a certain 'causal power', as searle puts it. Even a bunch of chinese people phoning each other, acting as neurons, has an edge over a one-step-at-a-time-turing machine.

You need a network to have consciousness, seems the case. A turning machine (or a computer like we have today) doesn't create a network, it just does 0010101010101 in a row and some 10101010 pop out that we interpret as having a meaning.

Originally Posted by Xei

Yes, the majority of people in this thread have the wrong end of the stick. The question is completely valid. Certainly the matter in our brains shifts about; the molecules that make up a cell aren't fixed in place, they will be recycled and ultimately leave the body at some point, to be replaced by new ones.

This is why fuctionalism is such a rock solid philosophy, even if morons like Searle would disagree with poorly constructed 'counter examples'. Functionalism states that what matters is not what something is made of, but the causal relationships between parts of a system.

To suggest the reverse is biological chauvinism, and it is absurd. For a start you are suggesting there is something inherently conscious about this:



But not this:



(Those are carbon and silicon atoms respectively).

Also you are suggesting that every time a new water molecule enters a neuron or an ion moves about, consciousness is destroyed and recreated. What exactly do you possibly mean by changing the molecules? What is a change? A little movement of one molecule? A movement of a large number of molecules at once? A chemical reaction between molecules? In any case, each of these things happens trillions of times per second in the brain, and to suggest that each one has an individual consciousness is therefore absurd.

It is therefore the system which is crucial to consciousness.

This I find fascinating though. There is not really supposed to be any such thing as a solid lump of matter in the universe; instead, reductionism holds that it is a collection of billions of little atoms. Concepts just generally aren't supposed to be real, and causality has no existence, it is just a product of laws. But functionalism shows us that actually it is these ideal concepts (solid objects, cells, nodes in a network) which create individual consciousnesses, which are completely distinct things. To me this suggests naturalism and reductionism may turn out to be completely flawed.

What I find even more fascinating is that everything is just made up of probability waves, including us. Think about what that means for a second...