Thread: America's Turbulent Decline(hegemony & life cycle of emp

USA, which has enjoyed unrivalled economic, political, and military power since WWII, is now in relative decline. History demonstrates that all global powers experience a long period of growth on several strategic fronts; economy, production, defense, etc., followed by an equally long period of contraction. At this latter stage, global powers become progressively more aggressive and unstable. By contrast, on their way up such powers tend to be benign and focused on promoting international peace and liberal trade. In the course of pursuing these aims, the power acquires external commitments and obligations that it is easily able to handle because of its economic dominance.

However, a global power on it way down is assailed by the tension between the high costs of regulating the world and its unwillingness or inability to meet the consequential costs; in monetary, human, and military terms. The waning power enters into military battles that it could easily win. Britain, when it had already lost its supremacy, fought two world wars and attacked and tried to subdue many countries, including Iraq in 1920! But it is unable to devote sufficient resources to win the political contest, which is the only reason for going to war in the first instance. There is little choice in the matter.



If the supreme power of the day refuses to go to war then the cat is out of the bag. It is not the unquestioned world leader anymore. But if it goes to war then it has to pay a hefty price to win the peace, which helps to debilitate it further. This is not a new feature. King Pyrrhus of Epirus said after defeating the Romans at Asculum in 279 BC: “One more such victory and we are lost.”



The overall impression given by a global power in decline is of a military and economic giant turned into a loose cannon. Its actions and policies cease to make sense. Observers then begin to look for explanations; such as conspiracies or incompetent leaders. Both might be right to a degree, but the problem is more fundamental, and infinitely more threatening to world peace.





The process of growth and decline has a number of distinctive features. The key aspect concerns the progress made in the early stages in building up economic and industrial muscle. In relative terms, military spending is kept low at that point. Progressively, the rising power acquires overseas commitments and interests that have to be promoted and then protected. Promotion is almost invariably pursued through advocacy of liberal economic policies. The rising economic power has everything to gain from increased international trade and low tariffs. Protection is undertaken through political and, when necessary, military means. Military spending increases to meet this demand, but economic supremacy makes this burden easy to shoulder in the early decades. These aspect were clearly evident in the ascendancy of the USA up to and including World War Two.



The push for international economic liberalization has in it the seeds of destruction for the hegemonic power. Other economies begin to prosper. They compete in industrial production and then in research and development. And they have an added advantage: their military spending and overseas commitments are relatively low. Again, this is clearly seen in the generous way the USA behaved after the war. The Marshall Plan was in action from 1947 to 1952 to rebuild European economies. However, it took these countries only a few years to become active competitors. And the debate at that point was mainly over the need, as seen by the USA, to shoulder more of the burden of defense expenditure. The economic power base of the USA was eroded and pressure for it to reduce its military spending mounted at the very moment when it had to maintain its grip on overseas markets and sources of materials.

In the case of the USA the situation could not have been more extreme. By the end of WWII most other economies were shattered. By contrast, the US economy thrived during the war and its mainland suffered no damage. US GNP was almost half that of the whole world. America was in a position to exercise what was called 'benign hegemony'. It was still in the ascendancy phase of being the world's supreme power. However, by the late-1960s America's share of world GNP was shrinking fast; down to 25.9 percent. The US economy remains by far the largest in the world, but it has lost the dominant position it had in the mid-1940s. This erosion continues; under attack from a united Europe and, even more dramatic, the emerging economic giants of China and India.

In the meantime the USA had taken on international responsibilities and commitments which, as in the case of Britain before, it could not shrug off easily. It is interesting that America is losing the battle to subdue Iraq at a time when almost half its available military manpower is over there! Imperial overstretch has never been more starkly evident.

There is always a fine line to tread between the costs and benefits of supreme power. By the late-1960s the costs of hegemony were under scrutiny. It was no longer a forgone conclusion that the benefits would justify the costs. The process of scrutiny is highly convoluted and far from being a conscious operation. However, once it starts it becomes clear the hegemony has entered a downward trend. At that point 'benign hegemony' turns into a highly aggressive effort, fuelled by those who gain most from the status quo. The beneficiaries begin to scout around for 'potential threats' that would justify continued high military spending and covert and overt operations on foreign soil. In the USA, the communist threat during the cold war was deployed for this purpose. Nowadays it is 'rogue states' and international terrorism.

The lengthy process of diminishing hegemony is turbulent. The waning power adopts aggressive, and at times highly unpredictable, courses of action. More to the point, the actions pursued are often difficult to analyze rationally. To the outside observer, which includes most of the population of the hegemonic power, the policies and actions adopted make little, if any, sense. The natural response is typified by the comment made by John Le Carré that in attacking Iraq "the USA has entered one of its mad periods".

Viewed from what is known in political economic science as the 'Hegemonic Stability Theory' America's actions over the last few decades begin to make some sort of sense. This does not make them any more palatable of course. Putting the blame on a 'stupid' president, the neo-conservatives, the Zionist lobby, or the Christian fundamentalists obscures the real motive force that drives America's adventures abroad. Change of presidency might alter the intensity and extremism of what is done but it would not transform the direction of travel much. The USA as the retreating hegemon is highly unstable and is a real danger to world peace regardless of who is in the White House.

And the UN as it is structured at present is not the answer. It is part of the problem, and that goes for its sister agencies such as WTO, IMF and the World Bank. These global agencies were set up at the Bretton Woods conference at the end of World War Two to regulate the world in accordance with the needs and aspirations of American hegemony. They continue to do so today, as was seen most obviously in the imposition of sanctions on Iraq that devastated the population and enriched the Ba'th regime. In the case of the children of Iraq, it would not be too fanciful to equate the sanctions with genocide. The world at large is affronted by the attack on the UN offices in Iraq. However, the people there had already come to the conclusion that there is little difference between the USA and the UN.

The points discussed above will have to be understood fully if the world were to try and avoid the worst of the consequences of America's decline as the reigning hegemonic power. The omens are not promising. China's rise, as possibly the next hegemonic power, will exacerbate the situation. A clash between the USA and China would be infinitely more bloody that anything seen so far.

One final point: it is noticeable that the departing hegemonic power always defers to the incoming power. This was the case in the relationship between Greece and the Roman Empire and between the Netherlands and Britain. Nowadays Britain follows the same pattern in its dealings with the USA. Blair is not Bush's poodle. All British prime ministers (with the possible exception of Edward Heath) exhibited the same proclivity. Who knows, perhaps in the next fifty years the USA will come to kow-tow to the all-powerful China!



(edited/condensed from http://www.globalcomplexity.org/USA%20in%2...%20Decline.htm)

I think the point of philosophy is to get to the point where one stops philosophizing.