Originally Posted by Xaqaria
You didn't say anything new with that post, DuB.
I was aiming for clarification, but I guess there was nothing that needed clarifying
Originally Posted by Xaqaria
I must say though, you chose a good and fitting example. Do you really believe that the assumption that it is better to feel good than to feel nothing is tautological? Keep in mind that there are entire philosophical schools that date back thousands of years that have amassed a pretty large body of literature claiming that this is in fact not true at all.
Not a tautology per se, rather that it's an analytic truth if "better than non-good things" is built right into the definition of "good" things, as most would opt to do. However, I fully accept that this is not at all a necessary definition of "goodness" or "feeling good," and relatedly that there's no definitive reason that the chain of propositions I posted has to stop at "good > not-good." We could easily continue decomposing the statement by, as another example, analyzing the ">" relation: asking what it means for something to be better or greater than something else, or if it's really possible for one thing to be better or greater than another, etc. On the other hand, there's also no definitive reason why we are obligated to pursue these lines of argument; we could simply accept the statement as it lies. I think we are basically in agreement about this?
I attempt to address the gaping issue of what then should (I think) guide our decisions to accept or deny certain basic propositions below...
Originally Posted by Xaqaria
The utility lies in remaining aware that no position that you take is grounded in any more fact than any other, since all facts stem from assumptions. A certain humility goes along with this awareness, and a new level of open mindedness that is not afforded to those that are not aware of the assumptions that they make just by getting up in the morning and attempting to apprehend the reality they perceive all around them. It allows one to entertain the idea of alternate logical frameworks that may be completely incompatible with the one that we are so used to operating in, but when you get right down to it are no less "true" than what we are using. It allows one to answer questions like, When is a door not a door? (when does a=/=a?) When it is a-jar, of course.
I think the utility that you describe does not come from actually denying that a = a (which is the question I was meaning to get across), but rather from simply remaining aware that it could be possible for one to deny it; that is, it is not a necessary truth which we are obligated to accept. However, while keeping this (and the humility possibly associated with it) in mind, we can still choose to personally accept that a = a, can we not?
But then why should we? For that matter, why shouldn't we? If in a deep sense there is no fundamental reason to prefer accepting the above proposition to denying it, why not just, e.g., choose randomly? So-called deviant logical systems reject certain assumptions of traditional logic (not randomly, mind you ) -- perhaps not "a = a," but similarly fundamental assumptions such as "all statements are either true or false, but none are both." (What if statements can be half-true? What if there are an infinity of truth values?* ) The traditional logician can point out that many such deviant logics often permit self-contradictions. However, the deviant logician can reply that it is the job of the traditional logician to show that such self-contradictions are to be avoided in the first place. In short, are there good reasons to accept traditional logical assumptions and reject deviant logics?
A really solid argument thereof is, frankly, outside my intellectual capacity. The best that I can do at least for the time being is to offer a weak, pragmatic, inductive argument that traditional logic has worked out pretty well for us so far. For example, arguably, all the principles of mathematics can be derived from traditional logical axioms, and mathematics has surely been of infinite aid to me personally throughout my life . Inductive arguments such as this are not without obvious flaws, of course, but there don't seem to be any counter-arguments for deviant logics and against traditional logic which are any more compelling, so it will perhaps suffice.
Deviant logics raise really interesting issues. I haven't read much about them. I'm still working on the intricacies of traditional logic
* Note that this is different from probability, which is intended to qualify the underlying binary truth values.
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