Originally Posted by
Xei
I don't think Plato makes clear the exact nature of the world of Forms and the mechanism by which they interact with the world of experience. To elaborate on what he does say, though, Forms aren't thought of as being things of thought; they are thought of as separate, objective entities existing in some kind of timeless, spaceless place. So, we think of the object 'red', and the object 'sphere', and so on. One of the important reasons this construct is invoked is to solve the problem of universals; what is the ontological status of commonalities between things? For example, why do all round objects seem to have a similar quality about them that allows us to name them 'round'? Plato's answer is that before birth our souls were exposed to the World of Forms, but at birth we developed a kind of amnesia about them. When we see a round object, what is actually happening is that this experience is stirring in us a memory of what we saw before birth; namely, the Form 'round'.
It sounds to me like the Implicate Order does not contain Forms in any sense. It contains all matter in an indistinct mass. In this reality, it seems to me that there would not be such a thing as 'round', there would only be pieces of the reality which, at their spatio temporal location, clump into a roughly round shape.