Originally Posted by JoannaB
and rationally arguing with them might possibly guilt them into pretending but that would not be enough
(Don't mean to pick out unimportant inconsistencies but I feel like Abra may bring this up so it's an inb4 thing )
How can someone be guilted into something as the result of a rational argument?
To be honest I'm not sure what side I take on any of this, but I'll outline the underlying problem as I see it. The next paragraph may sound trivial and unrelated, but I feel it's necessary to clarify first.
Obviously, if a person decides to do something, it's because they wanted to do it. And they wanted to do it because they think it will increase their happiness. Whether they're right or mistaken, whether it's short-term or long-term happiness they're after, whether it was a simple decision or they were conflicted; whenever someone decides to do something, it is because they think it will satisfy some desire(s) which they feel are most important at the time. And those desires can, of course, include altruism (feeling good because you've made someone else happy). These fundamental desires to be in certain states of mind cannot be changed through reason. We can, however, use reason to figure out how best to go about achieving these states of mind.
We can also use reason, in some cases, to make ourselves realize that attaching a particular feeling to a certain outcome is irrational. For example, let's say some person got attacked by a dog when he was a child. Now, well into adulthood, he's still afraid of dogs. One day, he's arguing with a friend who convinces him that he has no rational reason to be afraid of dogs, as most aren't dangerous. He realizes that dogs are harmless from then on, but even with this realization, it may take a while, if ever, for him to actually stop feeling fear at the sight of a dog. On the other hand, some emotions are pretty much fixed to be attached to certain outcomes. These are often the ones that make sense. They're biologically ingrained in us, and we're justified in our reactions. As an extreme example, a needle pricking into your skin is going to make you feel pain. You can't rationally argue against it by saying "there's no rational reason why I should feel pain." (which isn't true, but even if it were...) As another example, consider a guy whose wife has died after 40 years of marriage. You cannot use reason to tell him that he shouldn't miss her. Yeah, he'd be a lot happier if he stopped missing her, but it isn't going to happen.
The difference between that and the dog example should be clear. One can be altered with reason and the other can't. I'll also note that it isn't a black and white scenario. There may be some things that provoke us naturally but which can be overcome, etc.
Most of us will feel a stronger desire to help a friend than a homeless person because we've evolved to survive in groups, to treat people who we know better and who are part of our group as more valuable than a stranger. Most of us will also prefer our own biological children to others, because those children share our genes, and caring for them will give us a greater chance to pass them on. Not that that's the psychological reason, just the evolutionary reason for why the psychology evolved. So, the underlying question is: are these emotional associations ones that can even be overcome with reason? If not, then we just need to accept them, even though it may be unfortunate. If it's virtually impossible for someone, no matter how much they've reasoned it out to themselves, to feel as much love for an adopted child as for their own offspring, then there's no use in calling them out on it for being irrational. They have no control over their greater love for their real children. But if it is a feeling that can be reasoned out of, those emotions can be rationally changed. A similar case can be made for the homeless vs. friend question.
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