The images shown to red-green colourblind people show that they can't distinguish between certain shades of red and green. They don't tell us how they perceive them. I had a colourblind bio teacher who said he can tell the difference between red and green, that they're different colours, but he has trouble distinguishing between them when the shades are close. We're shown images of sort of a murky green colour, which are the best guesses as to what they see red as, but they're really just guesses.
Why would we only not be able to tell what it feels like to be a bat, if bats are vastly different from us? What if they are? Then we wouldn't know what it's like to be a bat, and that would pose a problem. I can't figure out whether you think what things feel like should be determinable from knowing everything about the object, or not. You seem to keep changing your stance on it. One post you're saying conscious states should be determinable, and they are. The next you're saying conscious states shouldn't be determinable, and they aren't.
What about the light spectrum, and certain species' abilities to see UV light? No matter how much we knew about those species' brains, we'd never know what UV light looks like, even if we had all information.
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