Thread: Natural Reincarnation?

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

As with matter, there's nothing inherently special about a certain position in spacetime, I don't see how that could be relevant to recreating an individual. Same thing with continuity, which is really just a mental concept,.

Again, by itself there's nothing special to these factors. I found the thread where a similar discussion was had regarding teleportation.

http://www.dreamviews.com/community/...ad.php?t=81794

Originally Posted by Photolysis

Again, by itself there's nothing special to these factors. I found the thread where a similar discussion was had regarding teleportation.

http://www.dreamviews.com/community/...ad.php?t=81794

But your argument in there is based on the (as far as we know) false assumption that position and continuity in matter constitution has an objective relevance to physics.

Originally Posted by DuB

As I mentioned above, this does not follow from the premises supplied by the original argument, which include infinite time. If it's possible for a person to be physically recreated down to identical molecules, why is it impossible for this new thing to undergo the same "circumstances" as the original thing? Both are vanishingly improbable to be sure, but if the first case is possible then the second must be possible as well.

As improbable as the reincarnation would be, for the same physical and mental development to occur after would be many times more improbable.

Still I wasn't saying the reincarnated person would stop being that person. The point to consider here is how much of "you" is innate to your genes, and how much is crafted by the surroundings.

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

As improbable as the reincarnation would be, for the same physical and mental development to occur after would be many times more improbable.

This is as obvious as it is irrelevant. Unless we're going to draw some completely arbitrary line and say, "Anything beyond this point is just too improbable to be possible!", then we have to consider the possibility that the even-more-improbable event that development would occur in the same exact fashion is possible. Ipso facto (I never thought I would use that term twice in one day ), it does not follow that the "me-clone" will necessarily diverge in its development from the original person.

So the new question becomes, even in the case that development occurs in the exactly the same way for the clone, would we be justified even then in saying that it is the "same person"? Or is it "just a clone"?

Since the discussion has clearly headed toward the question of personal identity, I want to post a couple very amusing (and, yes, actually thought provoking) links on the subject. The first is this youtube video which I think should have been subtitled "Metaphysics for Tots." By the way, I virtually guarantee that the theme music for this video will get stuck in your head.


The second is the probably the only inane, online self-quiz that you'll ever be glad you took. It's called "Staying Alive":
http://www.philosophersnet.com/games/identity.htm

I've taken that quiz before and it is a perfect example of how very intelligent people who have no clue what a soul is are capable of completely misrepresenting it in order to bolster their point of view. It is a classic materialist misunderstanding to try to represent the soul as a 'thing' that can be somehow left behind (or frozen).

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

But your argument in there is based on the (as far as we know) false assumption that position and continuity in matter constitution has an objective relevance to physics.

I didn't say it has any objective relevance, or importance. The only person it would be relevant to is the person being teleported. Or regarding this thread, the person who wonders about maintaining their personal identity. No external observer would be able to tell the difference.

We're dealing with the metaphysical here, not the actual physical.

The second is the probably the only inane, online self-quiz that you'll ever be glad you took. It's called "Staying Alive":

Very interesting, here's what I got!

Congratulations! According to one theory of personal identity, you have survived!

You chose:
Round 1: It's the spaceship for me!
Round 2: I'll take the silicon!
Round 3: Freeze me!

However, although you have survived, you seem to have taken an unnecessary risk.

There are basically three kinds of things which could be required for the continued existence of your self. One is bodily continuity, which actually may require only parts of the body to stay in existence (e.g., the brain). Another is psychological continuity, which requires, for the continued existence of the self, the continuance of your consciousness, by which is meant your thoughts, ideas, memories, plans, beliefs and so on. And the third possibility is the continued existence of some kind of immaterial part of you, which might be called the soul. It may, of course, be the case that a combination of one or more types of these continuity is required for you to survive.

Your choices are consistent with the theory known as psychological reductionism. On this view, all that is required for the continued existence of the self is psychological continuity. Your three choices show that this is what you see as central to your sense of self, not any attachment to a particular substance, be it your body, brain or soul.

But there is a tension. In allowing your brain and body to be replaced by synthetic parts, you seemed to be accepting that psychological continuity is what matters, not bodily continuity. But if this is the case, why did you risk the space ship instead of taking the teletransporter? You ended up allowing your body to be replaced anyway, so why did you decide to risk everything on the spaceship instead of just giving up your original body there and then?

But there is a tension. In allowing your brain and body to be replaced by synthetic parts, you seemed to be accepting that psychological continuity is what matters, not bodily continuity. But if this is the case, why did you risk the space ship instead of taking the teletransporter? You ended up allowing your body to be replaced anyway, so why did you decide to risk everything on the spaceship instead of just giving up your original body there and then?

Rebuttal: because this involved a break in continuity and the replacement of the matter all at the same time, thus destroying the original according to my argument above. If the original matter had been transmitted somehow I would have gone with that.

Rebuttal: The synthetic replacement argument seems irrelevant given that a natural brain constantly undergoes change, repair, replacement, and suchlike. As this occurs naturally with seemingly no loss in personal identity, it does not appear like it would make any difference regardless of whether the material was biological or artificial, assuming the difference in the properties is negligible.

Staying Alive

Congratulations! According to one theory of personal identity, you have survived!

You chose:
Round 1: Take me to the teletransporter!
Round 2: I'll take the silicon!
Round 3: Freeze me!

There are basically three kinds of things which could be required for the continued existence of your self. One is bodily continuity, which actually may require only parts of the body to stay in existence (e.g., the brain). Another is psychological continuity, which requires, for the continued existence of the self, the continuance of your consciousness, by which is meant your thoughts, ideas, memories, plans, beliefs and so on. And the third possibility is the continued existence of some kind of immaterial part of you, which might be called the soul. It may, of course, be the case that a combination of one or more types of these continuity is required for you to survive.

Your choices are consistent with the theory known as psychological reductionism. On this view, all that is required for the continued existence of the self is psychological continuity. Your three choices show that this is what you see as central to your sense of self, not any attachment to a particular substance, be it your body, brain or soul. However, some would say that you have not survived at all, but fallen foul of a terrible error. In the teletransporter case, for example, was it really you that travelled to Mars or is it more correct to say that a clone or copy of you was made on Mars, while you were destroyed?

Didn't take much more than a second thought for me, and I suspect, had the circumstances been real, a day or week would have been all I needed to think. I personally want to be around as long as is comfortable. I can't stand not knowing what will happen to the world, so living longer will help that. Plus, the transporter did make a copy. And that's all I needed. In essence, it may be difficult knowing that I will, but I feel that if I am already gone before the new copy comes to be, the copy is now me in every essence. It reminds me of an episode of the outer limits where they made a clone alike in every way other than a birth-mark. It seemed like a good idea until the person cloned woke from her coma. Basically, this shows how unsteady ethics really are, just as the video you posted does. But why would one decide to risk their life just to take a moral high-ground?

I've taken that quiz before and it is a perfect example of how very intelligent people who have no clue what a soul is are capable of completely misrepresenting it in order to bolster their point of view.

I have my own idea of what a soul is. I just consider it irrelevant to what is being expressed in the quiz. I know what kind of person I am. I am impatient, I want to live a long time, and I trust in technology far more than I trust in mother nature (in this case, at least. I think mother nature would get every problem I'm faced with fixed and fool-proof, it's just that I would be sacrificed, along with numerous others, to achieve that greater good).

And to clear up first sentence of this post, I consider the soul a sort of life force. I believe that it is part of the body just as the brain is, but by nature cannot be distinguished, though it may be observable. I do not consider it immortal by any means. I just consider it something that makes the body work, just like a heart, brain, or any other body part.

Originally Posted by DuB

This is as obvious as it is irrelevant. Unless we're going to draw some completely arbitrary line and say, "Anything beyond this point is just too improbable to be possible!", then we have to consider the possibility that the even-more-improbable event that development would occur in the same exact fashion is possible. Ipso facto (I never thought I would use that term twice in one day ), it does not follow that the "me-clone" will necessarily diverge in its development from the original person.

So the new question becomes, even in the case that development occurs in the exactly the same way for the clone, would we be justified even then in saying that it is the "same person"? Or is it "just a clone"?

Since the discussion has clearly headed toward the question of personal identity, I want to post a couple very amusing (and, yes, actually thought provoking) links on the subject. The first is this youtube video which I think should have been subtitled "Metaphysics for Tots." By the way, I virtually guarantee that the theme music for this video will get stuck in your head.


The second is the probably the only inane, online self-quiz that you'll ever be glad you took. It's called "Staying Alive":
http://www.philosophersnet.com/games/identity.htm

Well, if you remember other posts by me in similar threads, I'm of the same opinion as you are. I don't believe identity resides in a 'soul' or anything of the sort.

You chose:
Round 1: Take me to the teletransporter!
Round 2: I'll take the silicon!
Round 3: Freeze me!

Originally Posted by Photolysis

I didn't say it has any objective relevance, or importance. The only person it would be relevant to is the person being teleported. Or regarding this thread, the person who wonders about maintaining their personal identity. No external observer would be able to tell the difference.

We're dealing with the metaphysical here, not the actual physical.

The question maybe metaphysical but that doesn't mean physics go out the window. Can you explain how rebuilding you with the same matter would be different from rebuilding you with new matter?

Is the original matter "labelled" somehow as "you"?

I agree.

For an easy answer, think of any show or movie that has ever involved two peoples "minds" switching bodies. Did you consider it the person being stuck in someone else's body, or a body stuck with someone else's mind? Of course you thought the first choice, because the other just wouldn't make sense. Now imagine the two people were clones. Would you even be able to tell they'd switched. Would THEY even be able to tell they'd switched. If one died during the transfer, would they think of it as themselves having died, or the clone having died? Chances are that if you answered any of those with logic and applied them to teleportation or reincarnation, you'd come to the conclusion that you are still you. And you're body is an exact replica, making it also you. There you have it, the new you is YOU!

I somehow believe in natural reincarnation, because of what the TS said about the universe recycling itself. Why would the soul, or something that can be used to build the soul that makes you, not be recycled aswell?

But the soul seems impossible to grasp, so I'm afraid I can't ever be assured about natural reincarnation and still have to consider the possibility of nothingness after death. I fear death.

Can you explain how rebuilding you with the same matter would be different from rebuilding you with new matter?

I explained my stance in the other thread simply via thought experiments. In particular the one where body A and body B overlap in time (therefore clearly making them different), and where body A and body B do not overlap in time (why would the fact that they no longer co-exist mean the original identity is preserved).

As I have stated repeatedly, I speculate that the identity of an object is related to 3 properties, and 1 must remain constant at any given time for the identity to persist. I can't explain why this should be the case, I can only argue about why this seems to be the case. This also provides a "real world" answer to the question on whether our personal identity is truly the same as it was say last year, as well as questions like "if we replace our brain with artificial components, is it still the same person?".

The reason why I believe using the same matter/energy is essential in this case is because having the other 2 factors remain constant is impossible. The position in spacetime will change, especially if the universe goes through a phase where it ceases to have any meaning. There can't be any continuity for obvious reasons.

But the position in space and time doesn't matter at all. Having the copy and the original existing at the same time doesn't prove some magic property of identity exists, if anything it proves that our intuitions' soulish concept of identity is flawed.

If you make a copy of someone, it doesn't matter who's the original. The simple answer is that there's two of them.

If you make a copy of someone, it doesn't matter who's the original. The simple answer is that there's two of them.

Let's say I make an exact copy of you, then shoot you in the head. To everyone else, there's not a problem (questionable ethics aside). For all purposes, you're still there. No one else could tell any difference.

From your perspective, the difference is extremely important: your version of you will be dead. Your mind isn't going to magically leap in to your clone body. This other body will act exactly like you, and be like you in every regard. But it won't be you.

For some people this isn't a problem. For others, including myself, it is a major problem. And an extremely important question to answer in regards to many questions such as mind uploading, teleportation, replacement of brain components and so on.

I know for a fact that even if I'm dead, another version of me walking around doesn't comfort me much (though it might mean the people I love are less sad).

Originally Posted by Photolysis

Let's say I make an exact copy of you, then shoot you in the head. To everyone else, there's not a problem (questionable ethics aside). For all purposes, you're still there. No one else could tell any difference.

From your perspective, the difference is extremely important: your version of you will be dead. Your mind isn't going to magically leap in to your clone body. This other body will act exactly like you, and be like you in every regard. But it won't be you.

For some people this isn't a problem. For others, including myself, it is a major problem. And an extremely important question to answer in regards to many questions such as mind uploading, teleportation, replacement of brain components and so on.

I know for a fact that even if I'm dead, another version of me walking around doesn't comfort me much (though it might mean the people I love are less sad).

Yes, I'm afraid of vanishing out of existence because of that. It's equal to dying to me. Why do some people take this so lightly? I do not understand.

But the thing is, you already have jumped to the other body. It took your EXACT consciousness and brought it to something else. There is only a problem if the first consciousness is not terminated. The problem you are creating is the ethics of cloning basically. If the brain barrier is broken, making each the same in consciousness as well as physical being, then there is no difference. But now there are two. And the brain has problems with that. Think about if YOU were the copy. every part of your brain and body would lead you to believe you'd just teleported. But when faced with the facts, would you consider yourself just a copy? I highly doubt it. So why should the original?

You are looking at this from an extremely egotistical standpoint. You do exist no matter which one of you dies. Think of the video above. When having been mixed up, you could not tell which was the original. That's because the only difference was the time of creation, which is no more a reason for them not being you than it is a reason they should die instead of you.

Originally Posted by Photolysis

Let's say I make an exact copy of you, then shoot you in the head. To everyone else, there's not a problem (questionable ethics aside). For all purposes, you're still there. No one else could tell any difference.

From your perspective, the difference is extremely important: your version of you will be dead. Your mind isn't going to magically leap in to your clone body. This other body will act exactly like you, and be like you in every regard. But it won't be you.

For some people this isn't a problem. For others, including myself, it is a major problem. And an extremely important question to answer in regards to many questions such as mind uploading, teleportation, replacement of brain components and so on.

I know for a fact that even if I'm dead, another version of me walking around doesn't comfort me much (though it might mean the people I love are less sad).

I understand what you're saying, I was of the same opinion as you at least until less than 2 years ago.

The idea that something would be lost if one is replaced with an exact copy is an illusion of the ego I think. Because really, from the point of view of physics the only way your "consciousness" could be lost is if it was some sort of soul which was replaced along with the original body/matter.

I'm not saying that "you" would feel what the copy feels, rather, I'm saying that there isn't an exterior individual "you" that feels what the body experiences. I think consciousness is a property of you, rather than consciousness being you. (eg. if we replaced the sun with an exact replica, would you say that from that point on the gravity keeping the Earth in orbit had changed, that it was a "new" gravity?)

OMG! I KNEW THERE WAS NEW GRAVITY! I DON'T WEIGH THE SAME AS I DID AT BIRTH!

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

I understand what you're saying, I was of the same opinion as you at least until less than 2 years ago.

The idea that something would be lost if one is replaced with an exact copy is an illusion of the ego I think. Because really, from the point of view of physics the only way your "consciousness" could be lost is if it was some sort of soul which was replaced along with the original body/matter.

I'm not saying that "you" would feel what the copy feels, rather, I'm saying that there isn't an exterior individual "you" that feels what the body experiences. I think consciousness is a property of you, rather than consciousness being you. (eg. if we replaced the sun with an exact replica, would you say that from that point on the gravity keeping the Earth in orbit had changed, that it was a "new" gravity?)

An exact replica of the sun. It can't be made out of matter from the original sun right? So since the exact replica of the sun is made out of other matter than the original sun, I'd say that there's indeed "new gravity" that keeps the earth in orbit. The gravity originates from different matter.

Originally Posted by Koalaman

An exact replica of the sun. It can't be made out of matter from the original sun right? So since the exact replica of the sun is made out of other matter than the original sun, I'd say that there's indeed "new gravity" that keeps the earth in orbit. The gravity originates from different matter.

But that's really not the case, if you instantly replace the sun with a replica, the gravity felt would be exactly the same in every possible aspect. Gravity isn't an individual objective "thing".

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

But that's really not the case, if you instantly replace the sun with a replica, the gravity felt would be exactly the same in every possible aspect. Gravity isn't an individual objective "thing".

Yes, the effect of the gravity is the same, but to me, it's still "new gravity". Because now it's different matter communicating gravity with the earth. I kind of see this gravity as something that can be seen as "individual".

Maybe I don't get your point. Care to explain some more?

Here's another example:

If you put a body inside a tank full of water, the water level will rise according to the volume of what was put inside. If you were to remove that body and in it's place put a replica (or something else with the same volume), you wouldn't say there was a "new" rise of the water level.

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

Here's another example:

If you put a body inside a tank full of water, the water level will rise according to the volume of what was put inside. If you were to remove that body and in it's place put a replica (or something else with the same volume), you wouldn't say there was a "new" rise of the water level.

I agree with that. The rise of the water level is still the same. The effect is the same. But the water molecules are communicating with a different body now, so the cause is still different in my opinion. So in a sense I would still see it as a "new water rise". The water rise effect is the same, but it's caused by a different communication.

When we look back at consciousness, I would see two equal consciousnesses. They act entirely the same. But they're still two "individual" consciousnesses.

But you can't provide a justification for that, you're just relying on intuition rather than logic.

According to your reasoning, if we kept making copies of someone indifenetly we'd be creating an infinite amount of new individual "consciousnesses". That makes no sense, you can't create something out of nothing.