scene1: frank is in the office of an eye color doctor. *the doctor holds up a book and asks "what color is it?" frank answer, "red." *the doctor says, "aha, just as i thuoght! your whole color mechanism has gone out of kilter. *but fortunately your condition is curable, and I will have you in perfect shape in a couple of weeks."
scene2: (a few weeks later) frank is in a laboratory in the home of an experimental epistemologist. *the epistemologist holds up a book and also asks, What color is this book?" now, frank has been earlier dismissed by the eye doctor as "cured." *however, he is now of a very analytical and cautious temperament, and will not make any statement that can possibly be refuted. *so frank answers, "it seems red to me."
episteomlogist (abbreviated as "e" from now on): wrong!
frank: i dont think you heard what i said. *i merely said that it
seems red to me
e: i heard you, and you were wrong
f: let me get this clear; did yo mean that i was wrong that this book
is red, or that i was wrong that it
seems red to me?
e: i obviously couldn't have meant that you were wrong in that it IS red, since you did not say that it is red. *all you said was that it SEEMS red to you, and it is THIS statement which is wrong.
f: but you can't say that the statement "it SEEMS red to me" is wrong.
e: if i CAN'T say it, how come i did?
f: i mean you can't MEAN it.
e: why not?
f: but surely I know what color the book SEEMS to me!
e: again you are wrong.
f: but nobody knows better than i how things seem to ME
e: i am sorry, but again you are wrong.
f: but who knows better than i?
e: i do.
f: but how could you have access to my private mental states?
e: private mental states! metaphysical hogwash! *look, i am a PRACTICAL epistemologist. *metaphysical problems about "mind" versus "matter" arise only from episteomlogical confusions. *epistemology is the true foundation of philosophy. *but the toruble with all past episteomlogists is that they have been using wholly theoretical methods, and much of their discussion degenerates into mere word games. *while other epistemologists have been solemnly arguing such questions as wheter a man can be wrong when he asserts that he believes such and such, i have discovered how to settle such questions EXPERIMENTALLY.
f: how could you possibly decide such things empirically?
e: by reading a person's thoughts directly.
f: you are a telepathic?
e: of course not. *i simply did the one obvious thing which shoud be done. *i have constructed a brain-reading machine--known technically as a cerebrescope--that is operative right now in this room and is scanning every nerve cell in your brain. *i thus can read your every sensation and thought, and it is a simple objective truth that this book does NOT seem red to you.
f: goodness gracious, i really could have sworn that the book seemed red to me; it sure SEEMS that it seems red to me!
e: i'm sorry, but you are wrong again.
f: really? ir doesn't even SEEm that it seems red to me? *it sure SEEMS that it seems that it seems red to me!
e: wrong again! and no matter how mant times you reiterate the phrase "it seem like" and follow it by "the book is red" you will be wrong.
f: this is fantastic! suppose instead of the phrase "it seem like" i would say "i believe that." * i'll change my original statement to "i BELIEVE that the book is red." *is that true or false?
e: just a moment while i check the machine...no, that's false.
f: and what about "i believe that i believe...etc"
e: no, it doesn't matter how many times you say "i believe" it will be false.
f: well this has been a most englightening expereince. *however, you must admit that it is a little hard on me to realize that i am entertaining infinitely many erroneous beliefs!
e: why do you say that your beliefs are erroneous?
f: but you have been telling me this all the while!
e: i most certainly have not!
f: good god, i was prepared to admit all my errors, and now you tell me that my beliefs are not errors; what are you trying to do, drive me crazy?
e: hey, take it easy! please try to recall: when did i say or imply that any of your beliefs are erroneous?
f: just simply recall the infinite sequence of sentences: i believe this book is red; i believe that i believe that this book is red; and so forth. *you told me that every on of those statements is false.
e: true.
f: then how can you consistenyl maintain that my BELIEFS in all these false statements are erroneous?
e: because, as i told you, you don't believe any of them.
f: i think i see, yet i am not absolutely sure.
e: look, let me put it another way. *don't you see that the very falsity of each of the statements that you assert SAVES you from an erroneous belief in the preceding one? *the first statement is simply to the effect that you believe the first statement. *if the second statement were TRUE, then you would believe the fisrt statement, and hence your belief about the first statement would indeed be in error. *but fortunately the second statement is false, hence you don't really believe the first statement, so your belief in the first statement is not in error. *thus the falsity of the second statement implies you do NOT have an erroneous belief about the first; the falsity of the third likewise saves you from an erroneous belief about the second, etc.
f: now i see perfectly! so none of my BELIEFS were erroneous, only the statements were erroneous.
e: exactly.
f: most remarkable! incidentally, what color is the book really?
e: it is red.
f: what!
e: exactly! of course the book is red. *whats the matter with you, don't you have eyes?
f: but didn't i in effect keep saying that the book is red all along?
e: of course not! you kept saying it SEEMS red to you, it SEEMS like it seems red to you, and so forth. *not once did you say that it IS red. *when i orginially asked you "what color is the book?" if you had simply answered "red" this whole painful discussion would have been avoided.[/b]
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