Perception of Self Entirely Based on Sensory Input?

[thegnome54]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070824/...LlFGozRKis0NUE When you think about it, it makes perfect sense - what else could tell us where we were and what position our bodies were in? Sensory information from the Peripheral nervous system could be entirely responsible for our perception of self. This brings some interesting questions - if we were able to create a virtual reality which fed into all five of our senses, would we be entirely convinced that we were actually there, despite our knowledge that it's just a game? Interestingly enough, we don't need to create something like this, because it already exists - our dreams. This research validates, to me at least, the experience of lucid dreaming. Some people say 'it's all fake, so why does it matter? What's the point?'. The point is, if we can become lucid enough to use all of our senses, then for all intents and purposes, we are there. This also explains the convincing nature of out-of-body experiences and astral projection or what have you. Any thoughts?

[Serkat]

You're making the presumption that the ontological mind is located somewhere in the physical universe. Why? I for myself don't think of me as some little dork sitting in my head with a bunch of levers and buttons in front of him. My consciousness is filled with input from my senses, sure, but that doesn't mean that I am "inside" my head. The only reason that I "feel" my thoughts (as opposed to my sensory perception of the world around me) as being inside my head is my sensory perception. That doesn't mean that me or my thoughts actually are "inside" my head. That's not some big revealing thought though, seems pretty basic to me. And for that experiment, I find it pretty obvious that we locate ourselves in the physical universe based on the input we get from our senses. There's not really any alternative to that... and even if there were, it wouldn't make any sense. What would be the point of feeling out of body if none of our senses supported this idea? It would be just plain stupid. I mean, it's a neat little experiment they made, but the results are common sense, especially if you have experience in lucid dreaming and know some first-hand stuff about sensory perception cut off from the body. There's no alternative to creating your self-perception based on your senses. Your senses are the one and only means to connect you to the outside world so they are your only possibility to create a sense of spatial self. Which doesn't imply that you actually are somewhere in the physical universe (ontologically speaking), you just feel like you are. I don't really get what they were even trying to prove with that experiment? Did they expect the spatial Ego to just stay inside the head if they altered all the senses? That just wouldn't make any sense. Just imagine you walk down the street (changing sensory information), but your feeling of self got stuck when you were taking a shit at home. Humans wouldn't be able to survive that way.

[thegnome54]

You're making the presumption that the ontological mind is located somewhere in the physical universe. Why? Why? Because there is absolutely no evidence to support the idea that there is anything non-physical about the human mind. There also happens to be loads and loads of evidence that it is only physical. If there really was a non-physical component, wouldn't we still be aware after being punched in the face, instead of blacking out and not even registering the passage of time? There's really no reason to assume a non-physical component. And for that experiment, I find it pretty obvious that we locate ourselves in the physical universe based on the input we get from our senses. There's not really any alternative to that... It's really not that simple, though. In a dream, all of our senses tell us that we are in a dream world. However, we are still aware that it is only a dream, and that we are actually just in our beds. Memories called up from the brain itself carry a lot of weight in the matter, it's not only our peripheral senses. The question is, can we fool the brain entirely if the senses are realistic enough?

[Serkat]

Why? Because there is absolutely no evidence to support the idea that there is anything non-physical about the human mind. There also happens to be loads and loads of evidence that it is only physical. If there really was a non-physical component, wouldn't we still be aware after being punched in the face, instead of blacking out and not even registering the passage of time? There's really no reason to assume a non-physical component. There are several good reasons. You're mixing up stuff there. I'm not saying that the human mind (and by mind I only mean the ontological mind, not the psychological) is working independently of physical factors. For all I know, it is 100% dependent on physical factors, but this doesn't mean that it is identical with physical phenomenons. Whether or not you black out after being punched in the face doesn't have anything to do with the body-mind-problem. You can punch my face, but you can't punch my mind. You can look at my brain, but you can't look at my mind. Also, to be honest, "being" a mind subjectively feels a lot different than, for example, a chicken sandwich. The one is physical, the other clearly isn't. That's the basic predicament of this problem. And I want to add that personally I believe that physical states and mind states correlate directly in the sense that we'd work exactly the same if there was no ontological mind. Everything would be the same, except feelings wouldn't really be feelings, they'd just be some neurons firing. Seriously, if you're in love, even if this feeling depends on neurons firing, it is not identical with neurons firing. It's really not that simple, though. In a dream, all of our senses tell us that we are in a dream world. However, we are still aware that it is only a dream, and that we are actually just in our beds. You're speaking of 2 totally different concepts though: 1) spatial consciousness and 2) the psychological Ego. Of course our Ego is constant, independent of sensory input. It's needed for psychological well-being. However, if spatial awareness tells you that you are in a dream jungle, then your knowledge of your dreaming body doesn't have an affect on your spatial awareness. It's just some abstract concept you're referring to while dreaming. Memories called up from the brain itself carry a lot of weight in the matter, it's not only our peripheral senses. The question is, can we fool the brain entirely if the senses are realistic enough? If you mean to ask, can we alter the psychological Ego simply by altering our senses, then no. All we can alter is our feeling of spatial existence but that doesn't have relevance in regards to our personality. All these guys tried to show was that our feeling of spatial existence depends on sensory input which I consider a given anyway. Even if you're blindfolded you still have proprioreceptors to tell you where your body and your head is at.

[thegnome54]

Whether or not you black out after being punched in the face doesn't have anything to do with the body-mind-problem. You can punch my face, but you can't punch my mind. You can look at my brain, but you can't look at my mind. Also, to be honest, "being" a mind subjectively feels a lot different than, for example, a chicken sandwich. Unless you're a chicken sandwich, how do you pretend to know this? Also, that's a bad analogy, because it's comparable to saying "A computer reacts to input a lot differently from a pad of paper, therefore the computer must not be physical". The human brain is much more complex and geared towards receiving and processing information, unlike a chicken sandwich. For all we know, the feeling of consciousness is merely a result of the processing of information going on in our brains. And I want to add that personally I believe that physical states and mind states correlate directly in the sense that we'd work exactly the same if there was no ontological mind. Everything would be the same, except feelings wouldn't really be feelings, they'd just be some neurons firing. How do you separate the neurons firing and the feeling itself? It seems a bit redundant. That's like saying "If a computer was really just physical, it couldn't run programs, it would just be a bunch of binary gates opening and closing!" The basic action of firing neurons could very well BE the feeling we sense, could it not? I see no reason to assume that the neurons firing need some outside source to generate an actual emotion. There are clear firing patterns associated with different emotions, so if the neurons themselves are not actually creating an emotion, what do you posit they're doing? Just... firing for the hell of it? You're speaking of 2 totally different concepts though: 1) spatial consciousness and 2) the psychological Ego. Of course our Ego is constant, independent of sensory input. It's needed for psychological well-being. However, if spatial awareness tells you that you are in a dream jungle, then your knowledge of your dreaming body doesn't have an affect on your spatial awareness. It's just some abstract concept you're referring to while dreaming. You seem to be quite knowledgeable in this area, but I don't really understand your terminology. I'm just a crappy high schooler, I have quite limited exposure to these things. Would you mind defining the psychological ego and spatial consciousness for me? I have a feeling that I know the concepts, just not the names.

[Xaqaria]

Korittke, there is no reason to believe that your brain is anything more than a physical machine except for a wishful thinking reason. There is absolutely no evidence to the contrary. When you say you can't look at the mind, this is correct but only because the mind is merely a concept that was created by human beings who couldn't grasp that our sense of self and awareness of the world is a product of electro-chemical impulses. If you operate under the assumption that this is correct, then the mind as you put it does not exist, and therefore can not be used as an argument in this discussion.

[Serkat]

Unless you're a chicken sandwich, how do you pretend to know this? Also, that's a bad analogy, because it's comparable to saying "A computer reacts to input a lot differently from a pad of paper, therefore the computer must not be physical". The human brain is much more complex and geared towards receiving and processing information, unlike a chicken sandwich. For all we know, the feeling of consciousness is merely a result of the processing of information going on in our brains. Yes, I do agree that the feeling of consciousness is merely a result of the brain processing information. I also find it likely that our mind itself has no impact on the brain. It's only a passive observer. Mind would then be a "simulation" of brain activity which I consider likely. Also some years ago these brain scientist dudes found out that consciousness is actually the last instance of the brain to receive information on a decision that was made. Like 300 ms before we think "OK, let's do this" our brain is already in the process of preparing for that action. Still consciousness is the result and not the process. How do you separate the neurons firing and the feeling itself? It seems a bit redundant. [...] The basic action of firing neurons could very well BE the feeling we sense, could it not? I understand your point but I can't really agree if you mean to say that the physical phenomenon of neurons firing is identical with the feeling of mind. I'd say that mind and matter are, in respect to the brain, two sides of the same coin. But it's not a one-sided coin. If you take a bunch of neurons and make them fire and look at them go, how is that consciousness? How is it different from a chicken sandwich? It's just physical phenomenons. You'd either have to say at which point matter gains a subjective perspective or you'd have to proclaim that a chicken sandwich has a subjective perspective as well. I define physical phenomena here by our ability to analyze them objectively by the means of science. But no matter how much you try, you can't ever gain an objective perspective on something that is by it's definition subjective which is the mind. That's like saying "If a computer was really just physical, it couldn't run programs, it would just be a bunch of binary gates opening and closing!" Well, are you implying that, since computers are also intelligent input-output machines, computers have a subjective experience as well, like the chicken sandwich I mentioned above? This subjective experience wouldn't have to be characterized by self-consciousness but it would be subjective nonetheless. I see no reason to assume that the neurons firing need some outside source to generate an actual emotion. There are clear firing patterns associated with different emotions, so if the neurons themselves are not actually creating an emotion, what do you posit they're doing? Just... firing for the hell of it? Well, they're firing in the physical universe. But what exactly makes it so that I have a subjective experience of them firing? Is it a law of nature that every physical phenomenon has a subjective experience attached to it? Does it apply to computers and chicken sandwiches? Would you mind defining the psychological ego and spatial consciousness for me? I have a feeling that I know the concepts, just not the names. By psychological Ego (or self) I mean that which you would define as your conscious self in psychological terms. It would include all the aspects of yourself that you are conscious of, such as patterns of thought, skills, memories, taste in music, interests and so on. Depending on your world view it might include your body or parts of it as well. It would be all that which characterizes the content of your mind and which gives you a sense of identity, a sense of being a seperate individual being. By spatial consciousness I tried to refer to the concept of a mind that has a feeling of direct presence in the physical realm. As a mind, if you have input from your senses, you feel that you are at a certain position in the physical world, just like a banana that just lies somewhere. You can exactly say where that feeling of "you" is. That feeling of you is totally independent of your personality though. If I were to overwrite your brain with a new sense of self, you'd still feel that you are right between your ears and eyes, pulling levers and pushing buttons, even if the contents of your consciousness changed. In this way your senses give you spatial orientation and, apart from having a psychological foundation of self, as outlined above, it also makes you feel that you are an intrinsic part of the world, just like a chicken sandwich. But now, when you dream, your consciousness is in a non-existing world so that's kinda weird. In that case, your spatial orientation if purely virtual, but in all cases it is based on your senses alone. Korittke, there is no reason to believe that your brain is anything more than a physical machine except for a wishful thinking reason. There is absolutely no evidence to the contrary. The reason is that the mind is non-physical. All matters of communication, which evidence is a part of, relate to objective concepts that have interpersonal meaning. You cannot look at the mind as you can look at a box of pretzels so the concept of mind has no interpersonal meaning. Rather it has a purely personal and subjective meaning and by talking of "mind" we (or in this case, I) presuppose that each of the persons we talk to 1) has a mind and 2) refers to his own experience of 'mind' when he uses the word "mind". Since I am 100% certain that I do have a mind I just assume that every other human being has one as well and that we can freely talk about the concept of mind... When you say you can't look at the mind, this is correct but only because the mind is merely a concept that was created by human beings who couldn't grasp that our sense of self and awareness of the world is a product of electro-chemical impulses. ...although in cases like this I actually fail to believe that all humans have a mind and I think that maybe some brains just don't have a psychic simulation attached to them which is kind of sad since you'll never really know what a feeling feels like. How is it just a concept? It's a fact that I have a mind. It's the most factual thing ever, it's even more factual than the existence of a physical universe. It's well possible that there is no physical universe, which would lead to Solipsism, but there's nothing as true as the fact that I exist as a mind. If you operate under the assumption that this is correct, then the mind as you put it does not exist, and therefore can not be used as an argument in this discussion. I think that this assumption is pretty weak. I have a mind and it's only fair to assume that everyone with a brain similar to mine has one as well. It doesn't make any sense to reduce the human mind to purely electro-chemical components since (in the case that you have a mind which I hope) you are always operating from the presumption that your own mind is real. In my opinion, the fact of mind should always be part of a discussion such as this, since it is the most obvious given there is. What's the point of just ignoring it and acting like we're only robots? We are biochemical robots but we do have a mind that seperates us from mechanical robots (which I assume but cannot prove - maybe robots have a mind as well).

[memeticverb]

I agree with Korittke, I think. The argument of eliminative reductionism seems to have fatal flaws and isnt very widely held in current academic philosophy. The reason being is that what it is like to experience pain, or sadness cannot be reduced to neurobiological firings. Hence the famous idea that it would not make sense to say "I feel my c-fibers firing at a certain frequency", when the object of the utterance is really, for example, ones grief over a lost loved one. I wont bore anyone, but there are many thought experiments that have developed illustrating this point further. See Jackson, Kripke of course, Chalmers, etc.

[thegnome54]

The reason being is that what it is like to experience pain, or sadness cannot be reduced to neurobiological firings. Why not? I think you're just reluctant to do so because that would mean that we're just biological machines, like plants and all other forms of life, and humans are far too important to admit that. Really, there's no reason not to believe that neurons create the feeling of sadness. Remember, we are neurons. We are our bodies. Why do you insist on inventing a new body part to explain something which is so self-explanatory?

[blade5x]

If we were able to create a virtual reality which fed into all five of our senses, would we be entirely convinced that we were actually there, despite our knowledge that it's just a game? Yes, there's actually OBE study right now involving tricking the brain's perception of where the "sense of self" is located. Thursday, August 23rd, 2007 Researcher induces out-of-body experiences A Swedish neuroscientist at the University College of London announced today that he has reproduced the out-of-body experience often reported by stroke victims, epileptics, drug users and those who have been through near death experiences. University H. Henrik Ehrsson’s experiment sheds light on how people are able to experience phantom pains in missing limbs, for example. Ehrsson in his most recent experiment, published by the journal Science, today, used a virtual reality headset and camera to cause 12 test subjects to view their own bodies as someone else’s. Ehrsson has also shown how a subject’s brain can tricked into thinking that a rubber hand is a part of his body, causing the subject to react to a threat to the false hand as if it were his own (see link and expert, below). The UCL experiment also shows how the controllers of virtual worlds such as Second Life might be able to blur the distinction between reality and fantasy with devices that literally separate consciousness from the human body. The consequences of that disembodiment would be catastrophic. “If the distinction fails, the animal might try to feed on itself and will not be able to plan actions that involve both body parts and external objects,” Ehrsson told the BBC several years ago. EDIT: I didn't realize you already had a link on this subject already heh.

[Xaqaria]

Yes, I do agree that the feeling of consciousness is merely a result of the brain processing information. I also find it likely that our mind itself has no impact on the brain. It's only a passive observer. Mind would then be a "simulation" of brain activity which I consider likely. Also some years ago these brain scientist dudes found out that consciousness is actually the last instance of the brain to receive information on a decision that was made. Like 300 ms before we think "OK, let's do this" our brain is already in the process of preparing for that action. Still consciousness is the result and not the process. I understand your point but I can't really agree if you mean to say that the physical phenomenon of neurons firing is identical with the feeling of mind. I'd say that mind and matter are, in respect to the brain, two sides of the same coin. But it's not a one-sided coin. If you take a bunch of neurons and make them fire and look at them go, how is that consciousness? How is it different from a chicken sandwich? It's just physical phenomenons. You'd either have to say at which point matter gains a subjective perspective or you'd have to proclaim that a chicken sandwich has a subjective perspective as well. I define physical phenomena here by our ability to analyze them objectively by the means of science. But no matter how much you try, you can't ever gain an objective perspective on something that is by it's definition subjective which is the mind. Well, are you implying that, since computers are also intelligent input-output machines, computers have a subjective experience as well, like the chicken sandwich I mentioned above? This subjective experience wouldn't have to be characterized by self-consciousness but it would be subjective nonetheless. Well, they're firing in the physical universe. But what exactly makes it so that I have a subjective experience of them firing? Is it a law of nature that every physical phenomenon has a subjective experience attached to it? Does it apply to computers and chicken sandwiches? By psychological Ego (or self) I mean that which you would define as your conscious self in psychological terms. It would include all the aspects of yourself that you are conscious of, such as patterns of thought, skills, memories, taste in music, interests and so on. Depending on your world view it might include your body or parts of it as well. It would be all that which characterizes the content of your mind and which gives you a sense of identity, a sense of being a seperate individual being. By spatial consciousness I tried to refer to the concept of a mind that has a feeling of direct presence in the physical realm. As a mind, if you have input from your senses, you feel that you are at a certain position in the physical world, just like a banana that just lies somewhere. You can exactly say where that feeling of "you" is. That feeling of you is totally independent of your personality though. If I were to overwrite your brain with a new sense of self, you'd still feel that you are right between your ears and eyes, pulling levers and pushing buttons, even if the contents of your consciousness changed. In this way your senses give you spatial orientation and, apart from having a psychological foundation of self, as outlined above, it also makes you feel that you are an intrinsic part of the world, just like a chicken sandwich. But now, when you dream, your consciousness is in a non-existing world so that's kinda weird. In that case, your spatial orientation if purely virtual, but in all cases it is based on your senses alone. The reason is that the mind is non-physical. All matters of communication, which evidence is a part of, relate to objective concepts that have interpersonal meaning. You cannot look at the mind as you can look at a box of pretzels so the concept of mind has no interpersonal meaning. Rather it has a purely personal and subjective meaning and by talking of "mind" we (or in this case, I) presuppose that each of the persons we talk to 1) has a mind and 2) refers to his own experience of 'mind' when he uses the word "mind". Since I am 100% certain that I do have a mind I just assume that every other human being has one as well and that we can freely talk about the concept of mind... ...although in cases like this I actually fail to believe that all humans have a mind and I think that maybe some brains just don't have a psychic simulation attached to them which is kind of sad since you'll never really know what a feeling feels like. How is it just a concept? It's a fact that I have a mind. It's the most factual thing ever, it's even more factual than the existence of a physical universe. It's well possible that there is no physical universe, which would lead to Solipsism, but there's nothing as true as the fact that I exist as a mind. I think that this assumption is pretty weak. I have a mind and it's only fair to assume that everyone with a brain similar to mine has one as well. It doesn't make any sense to reduce the human mind to purely electro-chemical components since (in the case that you have a mind which I hope) you are always operating from the presumption that your own mind is real. In my opinion, the fact of mind should always be part of a discussion such as this, since it is the most obvious given there is. What's the point of just ignoring it and acting like we're only robots? We are biochemical robots but we do have a mind that seperates us from mechanical robots (which I assume but cannot prove - maybe robots have a mind as well). You are living in a fantasy land in which everything you want to believe is self evident. Define your "mind". What you feel is this extra-physical existence outside of the contents of your skull, I see as an extremely complex electrical and biological machine that is capable of countless processes per second and can create as of yet uncounted combinations of information existing entirely of fleshy neural tissue and various fluids. If you can't show reasoning why you believe differently than I do, then you are a misguided fool. I have evidence, do you?

[Serkat]

If you can't show reasoning why you believe differently than I do, then you are a misguided fool. I have evidence, do you? You don't have any evidence whatsoever, you're just throwing assumptions at me. Philosophy is not natural sciences even though some philosophers have suggested that this is to be so. I disagree, philosophy is not natural sciences because it works with concepts that are beyond objectivity. I already put forth all my arguments. I already said that I will not define mind in a way that has interpersonal meaning because defining the mind as an objective concept contradicts its subjective nature by trying to project it onto the objective realm. This doesn't alter the fact the me and you both have a subjective experience of existing which we assume a chicken sandwich not to have. And I also mentioned that I presume that you take the existence of your mind as a given even though it is beyond the scope of natural sciences by default. I ask you to explain how matter makes for a subjective experience if you have a materialist standpoint. Do you believe that every physical process has a subjective experience of existing that represents this physical process in a different way, on a different ontological level? Do you believe that either only machines or only biochemical machines can create this experience because of their complexity? Then how would that work, in contrast to a chicken sandwich which you believe to have no subjective experience of its existence. If you're materialist, you are probably an evolutionist, so unless you are saying that the mind doesn't exist because its existence cannot be proven, then why did the human mind develop in the first place? If we're just biochemical computers, what's the point of having a representation of the processes in the mind. Or are you trying to say that there is no such thing as subjective experience because it cannot be proven? If this is so we have reached the end of the discussion.

[Xaqaria]

You don't have any evidence whatsoever, you're just throwing assumptions at me. Philosophy is not natural sciences even though some philosophers have suggested that this is to be so. I disagree, philosophy is not natural sciences because it works with concepts that are beyond objectivity. I already put forth all my arguments. I already said that I will not define mind in a way that has interpersonal meaning because defining the mind as an objective concept contradicts its subjective nature by trying to project it onto the objective realm. This doesn't alter the fact the me and you both have a subjective experience of existing which we assume a chicken sandwich not to have. And I also mentioned that I presume that you take the existence of your mind as a given even though it is beyond the scope of natural sciences by default. I ask you to explain how matter makes for a subjective experience if you have a materialist standpoint. Do you believe that every physical process has a subjective experience of existing that represents this physical process in a different way, on a different ontological level? Do you believe that either only machines or only biochemical machines can create this experience because of their complexity? Then how would that work, in contrast to a chicken sandwich which you believe to have no subjective experience of its existence. If you're materialist, you are probably an evolutionist, so unless you are saying that the mind doesn't exist because its existence cannot be proven, then why did the human mind develop in the first place? If we're just biochemical computers, what's the point of having a representation of the processes in the mind. Or are you trying to say that there is no such thing as subjective experience because it cannot be proven? If this is so we have reached the end of the discussion. Where did this chicken sandwich argument come from? I've seen someone else use it, and it was as useless then as it is here. No, a chicken sandwich is not capable of the same things that I am since it does not have a brain, not to mention any of several other key ingredients to sentient life. Show me the existence of the mind without the brain and you might convince me. If something doesn't exist without a specific other thing, then a direct correlation can be shown which is far more evidence than you have.

[thegnome54]

Why not? I think you're just reluctant to do so because that would mean that we're just biological machines, like plants and all other forms of life, and humans are far too important to admit that. Really, there's no reason not to believe that neurons create the feeling of sadness. Remember, we are neurons. We are our bodies. Why do you insist on inventing a new body part to explain something which is so self-explanatory? ehem...

[skysaw]

Gnome, Thanks for the link. I love this kind of stuff. If you haven't already, you should look into some of the writings of Daniel Dennet. My favorite is a little bit of fiction that touches on this very idea from his book "Brainstorms." Where Am I? One of the most charming and thought-provoking short stories I've ever read.

[memeticverb]

Why not? I think you're just reluctant to do so because that would mean that we're just biological machines, like plants and all other forms of life, and humans are far too important to admit that. Really, there's no reason not to believe that neurons create the feeling of sadness. Remember, we are neurons. We are our bodies. Why do you insist on inventing a new body part to explain something which is so self-explanatory? You made many errors and assumptions for such a brief post, but thats OK. 1. Its plain nonsense to say that these other forms of life are mere "biological machines". Im not a mystic, but if you could define "biological" and "machine," that would be great. You are brining in a whole new set of problems talking about other forms of life since it is still a deep mystery what their origins are, and what "mechanisms" were behind their evolution. So , Im not at all reluctant, and indeed, give a lot of credence to the notion that we have much more in common with all life, and even non-life, than previously imagined. 2. I didnt say, and I dont think anyone has said that in some fashion states of consciousness are not directly correlated with the neurophysiological make-up of the brain. If there is a change a state in consciousness then a change in the brain must also have occurred. But this does not mean that a state of consciousness is identical with the brain state. Someone could analyze your brain as throughly as they wanted but they would never see something they could call "sweet" or "sour". As another argument goes, if Mary the scientist were born colorblind, but learned every neurophysiological function in the brain having to do with color consciousness, she would still not know what it is like to experience, say, the color red. This knowing what-it-is-like to experience red is additional knowledge.

[memeticverb]

Y I already said that I will not define mind in a way that has interpersonal meaning because defining the mind as an objective concept contradicts its subjective nature by trying to project it onto the objective realm. This doesn't alter the fact the me and you both have a subjective experience of existing which we assume a chicken sandwich not to have. And I also mentioned that I presume that you take the existence of your mind as a given even though it is beyond the scope of natural sciences by default. I ask you to explain how matter makes for a subjective experience if you have a materialist standpoint. Do you believe that every physical process has a subjective experience of existing that represents this physical process in a different way, on a different ontological level? Do you believe that either only machines or only biochemical machines can create this experience because of their complexity? Then how would that work, in contrast to a chicken sandwich which you believe to have no subjective experience of its existence. If you're materialist, you are probably an evolutionist, so unless you are saying that the mind doesn't exist because its existence cannot be proven, then why did the human mind develop in the first place? If we're just biochemical computers, what's the point of having a representation of the processes in the mind. Or are you trying to say that there is no such thing as subjective experience because it cannot be proven? If this is so we have reached the end of the discussion. Very good post. I dont think your challenging questions will be answered, however. Physical materialists are forced by their logic to believe that experiences do not really exist, only brain processes. But to admit such a thing would sound too silly, as well as open them up for many critiques, like the one you just gave. Btw, If one wishes to be a physical reductionist one must study at length the numerous different versions and nuances of this view. There are at least a dozen or so, and just as many good arguments against them. That the posters here arent very familiar, yet hold so dearly to them isnt a good sign they are being open-minded.

[Neruo]

Actually, yea, it all makes perfect sense. People just want to think they have super-powers when they have an OBE, while there are perfectly logical explanations for it. Good thing no-one takes them seriously.

[Xaqaria]

Someone could analyze your brain as throughly as they wanted but they would never see something they could call "sweet" or "sour" Prove it. I'm sure you yourself are not claiming to know every function of the brain, so how exactly do you know that the sensation of sweet can not be witnessed through electro-chemical impulses? From what I've seen of the neurosciences, I would be willing to bet that isolating the senses is not that far down the road.

[Carôusoul]

I kinda agree with Xaqaria. All we can be sure of is the existence of the self. everything else is possibly simulated or a creation of ourself. That's kinda solopsist which isn't really convincing, but possible nonetheless. We can be sure of nothing except ourselves. like Descartes. "I think therefore I am"

[memeticverb]

Prove it. I'm sure you yourself are not claiming to know every function of the brain, so how exactly do you know that the sensation of sweet can not be witnessed through electro-chemical impulses? From what I've seen of the neurosciences, I would be willing to bet that isolating the senses is not that far down the road. Notice that you said the sensationof sweet, as if sweetness is a sensation that can be viewed in the brain. When you say "this apple tastes sweet", sweet refers to the entire physiological and functional aspects that make up this experience, plus what it is like to taste sweet. Think of the fact that if one were never to have the experience of sweet, then no matter how much neurophysiology they learned and no matter how many people tried describing it to them, they would never know what it is like...

[thegnome54]

Notice that you said the sensationof sweet, as if sweetness is a sensation that can be viewed in the brain. When you say "this apple tastes sweet", sweet refers to the entire physiological and functional aspects that make up this experience, plus what it is like to taste sweet. Think of the fact that if one were never to have the experience of sweet, then no matter how much neurophysiology they learned and no matter how many people tried describing it to them, they would never know what it is like... The same could be said for riding a bike, yet the bike riding is purely mechanical. Your argument is quite muddled - this is how I see it: 1) I can feel things 2) I can't feel things if you just explain them to me 3) The explanation must be false - I'm feeling something else It really doesn't make sense to me. Please clarify or rethink your argument.

[memeticverb]

The same could be said for riding a bike, yet the bike riding is purely mechanical. Your argument is quite muddled - this is how I see it: 1) I can feel things 2) I can't feel things if you just explain them to me 3) The explanation must be false - I'm feeling something else It really doesn't make sense to me. Please clarify or rethink your argument. I see this is going to be tough. Riding a bike isn't mechanical, in fact the learning of it is so complex we still have not figured it out, especially the part where one can go from having almost no coordination even with the utmost concentration, to then being able to do it without even thinking. This proves the point further, since if one learned every "mechanical" aspect of bike riding, they would still not know what its like and still have no balance the first time they tried. Heres a good overview article. The Mind/Body Problem and its Solution Heres one supporting my position (anti-reductionist) The Perennial Problem of the Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness Heres one supporting the eliminative materialist position. Daniel Dennet: Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness

[thegnome54]

I see this is going to be tough. Riding a bike isn't mechanical, in fact the learning of it is so complex we still have not figured it out, especially the part where one can go from having almost no coordination even with the utmost concentration, to then being able to do it without even thinking. Yes, it's complex. But it's mechanical. You have no proof that it's not. Here's what I see: 1) We can learn things pretty well 2) This cannot possibly be a mechanical process I really can't even fathom this leap. This proves the point further, since if one learned every "mechanical" aspect of bike riding, they would still not know what its like and still have no balance the first time they tried. What proves the point? Your unsupported assumption that learning is not mechanical? The second part of this paragraph is the same argument as before, which I already told you that I do not follow the reasoning of. Heres a good overview article. You shouldn't need articles to back up your personal beliefs on a forum. Just tell me what it says, or else it's nothing more than an appeal to authority. Please, just explain your reasoning to me. If you can't explain your reasoning without citing someone else's explanation, I really can't argue with you - I can only argue with those articles, which you won't be able to respond to satisfactorily, since you didn't write them.

[Neruo]

Prove it. I'm sure you yourself are not claiming to know every function of the brain, so how exactly do you know that the sensation of sweet can not be witnessed through electro-chemical impulses? From what I've seen of the neurosciences, I would be willing to bet that isolating the senses is not that far down the road. What the hell. Only because I saw you quoted it, I saw what a retarded statement that guy made. Actually, I am extremely sure we can 'see' with an MRI scanner whether someone is eating sour or sweet food. There are just different kinds of receptors in those areas. Slightly different parts of the brain will light up. Or like, once you know what (tiny) area of the brain is linked to syrup (by showing it or something), you might see activity of that area if someone is eating sugar or something that tastes sweet, like syrup. Basically, you are greatly underestimating what we can see with an MRI scanner. I can't even begin to imagen what we will be able to 'see' in the brain over 100 years. I don't think there will be much of the 'great mystery' left.