Some cool discussion going on here...
The point of this example is that, perhaps consciousness is like this example in the sense that consciousness may not really be a separate entity in of itself, but rather the totality of components that, themselves cannot be called "Yale". The author used this example to try to explain a different position on the subject (amongst several others).
Yeah, this is called the phenomenological argument. Important essays on this, if you are interested, are by Nagel (what is it like to be a bat?) and others. Nagel basically argues that we can study all there is to know about how a bat uses sonar, about its body and organs and DNA and the like, but we can never know the 'qualia' or 'what it is like to be' of a bat's experience. Thus, he argues, we can never adequately explain consciousness.
It's an interesting thought-experiment, but I think Nagel is misguided. He seems to have subjective experience and explanation mixed up - there is no 'other' thing of consciousness that we cannot explain, it's simply that it is impossible to subjectively experience what it would be like to be a bat. Nagel seems to be proposing some kind of 'subject.' As Dennet observes:
"…if your theory still has tasks for a Subject to perform, still has the need for a Subject as Witness, then although you can be falsely comforted by the sense that there is still somebody at home in the brain, you have actually postponed the task of explaining what needs explaining (229)." Consciousness Explained
It's a sort of ghost-in-the-shell scenario. Consciousness is likely to be adequately explained in the next two decades, but conscious subjective experience, by definition needs to be experienced. As it is, our consciousness is very likely simply a method of representation allowing survival. We are aware of and experience the world around us to enable us to find food, shelter and sex etc. We need a representation of our 'selves' in order to know that 'if I save this food for when I may be hungry i'll have a better chance of surviving.' Long-term survival decisions depend on us having a concept of ourselves as a being - if thought that 'I' will not exist in this body tomorrow, what's the point of eating today?
Evidence of this can be seen in developmental psychology, and cognitive psychology. The more intelligent a species is, the more self-awareness they display (chimps recognise themselves in the mirror, but cannot recognise that the chimp next to them in the mirror is the same chimp that is next to them if there is another chimp.) For example, childeren reach a point of 'theory of mind.' Here's the experiment:
A child is shown a chocolate box. The researcher opens it and takes out the chocolates, then puts pencils in there, with the child watching. They then let another child into the room. The researcher asks the first child "what will child B think is in here?" Up until about 3 1/2 years of age, the child will answer 'pencils.' Beyond that age, the child will answer 'chocolate.' Once at this age, the child is able to develop a 'theory of mind,' which is to say that he/she can represent other people and acknowledge and represent the beliefs they will have.
This is evidence of how our brains have evolved to become highly intricate. In a highly social world, we need to be able to see other people as 'people' capable of (false/true) beliefs. It has been proposed that people with severe autism have reduced theory of mind, and being unable to predict and attribute beliefs to other people can be seen as a significant problem in survival.
I mention all this, because from a naturalist, materialist and reductionist viewpoint, consciousness (my experience of being me) is simply a highly complex means of representation. Not only can I represent my body (pain, emotion) but I can represent the world I see, and also the people I meet. If I didn't have a sense of self-identity, I would be in big trouble trying to survive: I wouldn't. I would not be able to distinguish my own body from the rest of the world and I would not have any motivation to eat etc.
Evolutionarily speaking, our brains developed from the spinal chord (simple organisms) up, all the way to the prefrontal cortex (pretty much behind your forehead. It is the prefrontal cortex that performs the most abstract thinking, and seems to be the location of most of the things we would see as 'consciousness.'
As for the science-philosophy debate, it's actually quite multi-faceated. Increasingly, philosophy of mind is becoming a science, and philosophers are drawing upon the wealth of new cognitive findings to form and expand their theories. Analytic philosophy, which seems more detatched and meaningless, actually serves the purpose of allowing us to work out what we mean by concepts and words we use, through thought experiments etc. It's not a case of theory being opposed to experiment - both are in symbiosis. You cannot have one without the other.
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