Freewill

[Wayfaerer]

I've a few questions for anyone who might be interested in thinking about "freewill". 1.) What is freewill? (Assuming you take the most accepted definition of freewill being the ability of agents to freely choose among multiple possibilities of action...) 2.) As human beings, our actions are driven by impulses or desires developed by evolution. We all experience conflicting desires from time to time and experience a state of limbo, but even our end decision was motivated by a foresighted desire (maybe choosing the desire to eat healthy and having better energy for the day over the desire to eat what you think tastes good was only swayed by avoiding medical problems when you get older). There was no amorphous spirit agent called "you" other than that foresighted desire that decided between them. As animals of evolution seen in a naturalistic view, desire (whether impulsive or more complex) seems to be all there is leading to meaningful action. So my question is how can you define yourself as a single "agent" that chooses between actions that isn't just the natural play of turbulent desires? 3.) Whether you think freewill is compatible or incompatible with determinism, how is this view any different when it comes to indeterminism? If a definite fate makes "freewill" impossible, then how could being controlled by quantum randomness make you any more free? 4.) Considering the above questions, how is the age old inquiry of freewill not complete and utter bullshit? Care to make an attempt?

[Xei]

1, and by extension 3; I don't understand the question. A given definition should contain everything that free will is. I have never had a discussion about free will that wasn't in my opinion simply semantics. What precisely do you mean to imply, by mentioning evolution? How, incidentally, do actions like suicide fit?

[Carrot]

2) Why would you think an action controlled by a desire is not an act of freewill? Or I'm interpreting it wrongly.

[Wayfaerer]

2) Why would you think an action controlled by a desire is not an act of freewill? Or I'm interpreting it wrongly. Because I'm having a hard time seeing how we could choose the desires that lead us to our actions. Sure we could choose what desires we want or don't want, but it would only be in the light of another desire. The main point for me is that desires are a product of evolution, a matter we never had a choice in, so how are we free to choose between actions when the desires that drive them are just natural phenomena beyond our control?

[Carrot]

Because I'm having a hard time seeing how we could choose the desires that lead us to our actions. Sure we could choose what desires we want or don't want, but it would only be in the light of another desire. The main point for me is that desires are a product of evolution, a matter we never had a choice in, so how are we free to choose between actions when the desires that drive them are just natural phenomena beyond our control? I still don't quite get it. Using your example, if I choose not to eat what I want, I'm motivated by my desire to be healthy. If I choose to eat what I want regardless of the outcome, I believe I am giving in to a greedy desire or getting whatever you want desire.

[Wayfaerer]

I still don't quite get it. Using your example, if I choose not to eat what I want, I'm motivated by my desire to be healthy. If I choose to eat what I want regardless of the outcome, I believe I am giving in to a greedy desire or getting whatever you want desire. Right, and what other than their relative strengths and consideration of other desires decides which desire you give into? Is there really a separate middle-man that's free? What reason would it have to choose anything?

[Carrot]

Right, and what other than their relative strengths and consideration of other desires decides which desire you give into? Is there really a separate middle-man that's free? What reason would it have to choose anything? Every decision we made all boils down to what we want. Making an action for ourselves and not having it benefit us in any way is impossible. But linking every decision made to desires are a little overwhelming, it might not be desires all the time.

[Wayfaerer]

1, and by extension 3; I don't understand the question. A given definition should contain everything that free will is. I have never had a discussion about free will that wasn't in my opinion simply semantics. What precisely do you mean to imply, by mentioning evolution? How, incidentally, do actions like suicide fit? For the first question I'm asking you to define what you think freewill is. The definition I (and what most people) take is the ability of an agent to freely choose a course of action among alternatives. I mention evolution because it is the process of which we are a part of that has developed the desires which drive us to action, I'm just implying that it is completely relevant to the discussion of said freewill. I'm not sure what the significance of suicide would be compared to any other action driven by desire, I suppose it would just be the desire for permanent rest, or the relief from certain feelings.

[Xei]

For the first question I'm asking you to define what you think freewill is. The definition I (and what most people) take is the ability of an agent to freely choose a course of action among alternatives. That's what I thought you probably meant... so I guess you meant to say "assuming you don't take the most accepted definition"..? I don't really habitually take any definition of course, I just take the definition of my interlocutor. If you want to talk about the ability of an agent to freely choose a course of action from a set of alternatives then let's talk about that, although there's probably quite a bit of potentially important ambiguity hidden in subdefinitions there, the concepts of 'agent', 'choice' and 'freely' being some particularly suspect parts... in fact thinking about it, I'd say without defining 'free' the definition is meaningless. So, to your questions... I'm not clear on what you're trying to say by 2 and 3. In 2, are you saying the fact that everything we do is a consequence of previous external events contradicts agenthood? If so, why? And in 3... well I suppose I'll see what you mean by 'freedom' first.

[Wayfaerer]

That's what I thought you probably meant... so I guess you meant to say "assuming you don't take the most accepted definition"..? I don't really habitually take any definition of course, I just take the definition of my interlocutor. If you want to talk about the ability of an agent to freely choose a course of action from a set of alternatives then let's talk about that, although there's probably quite a bit of potentially important ambiguity hidden in subdefinitions there, the concepts of 'agent', 'choice' and 'freely' being some particularly suspect parts... in fact thinking about it, I'd say without defining 'free' the definition is meaningless. So, to your questions... I'm not clear on what you're trying to say by 2 and 3. In 2, are you saying the fact that everything we do is a consequence of previous external events contradicts agenthood? If so, why? And in 3... well I suppose I'll see what you mean by 'freedom' first. I guess I'm saying that an 'agent' with conflicting parts contradicts agenthood, at least regarding its ability to identify with one course of action that makes its will "free". As for the definition of "free", I suppose it would be the ability for the agent to choose what it wants unrestrained by other influences, but when the human being is a multitude of "wants" its agency seems kind of silly, let alone its freedom.

[Xei]

I think it's important to note that there are many things which we do are not in themselves selected for by natural selection. A good although partly hypothetical example is music, something which Stephen Pinker describes as 'auditory cheesecake'; there's something special about it which resonates in some way with the specific implementation of something which is selected for, namely our auditory system. The same is likely true of many of our cognitive faculties, such as our rationality. There are various epiphenomena do not emerge out of selective pressures. I guess I'm saying that an 'agent' with conflicting parts contradicts agenthood, at least regarding its ability to identify with one course of action that makes its will "free". I don't really know... is that really the human experience, of discrete and separate entities? Isn't our experience of choice making rather as a single something which sits above these desires (I guess Freud would call it a super id), weighing each? What would it mean to make a choice if there were not conflicting benefits? Surely by definition there must be conflicting parts for a choice to be made. As for the definition of "free", I suppose it would be the ability for the agent to choose what it wants unrestrained by other influences, but when the human being is a multitude of "wants" its agency seems kind of silly, let alone its freedom. So by freedom you essentially seem to mean a dualistic conception of the soul; a bundle of uncaused actions. I don't find it very concerning that such a thing doesn't seem to exist... of course, everything we do is the result of what went before. Action wouldn't make much sense otherwise.

[Wayfaerer]

I think it's important to note that there are many things which we do are not in themselves selected for by natural selection. A good although partly hypothetical example is music, something which Stephen Pinker describes as 'auditory cheesecake'; there's something special about it which resonates in some way with the specific implementation of something which is selected for, namely our auditory system. The same is likely true of many of our cognitive faculties, such as our rationality. There are various epiphenomena do not emerge out of selective pressures. Interesting example, and I agree. Though, the important thing really is that all those emergent activities stem from and appease those physical processes that were naturally selected for. I don't really know... is that really the human experience, of discrete and separate entities? Isn't our experience of choice making rather as a single something which sits above these desires (I guess Freud would call it a super id), weighing each? Maybe it seems that way, but is it? Where would this single something come from? Identity and 'moral' code might act like this, Freud's super-ego, but would this not be a naturalistic phenomenon ultimately made of desirable outcomes? Do our morals and identities not change and conflict drastically from one day to the next? It may not be very comfortable to admit but it seems like the things we care about that drive us to action are easily dynamical, maybe not exactly like separate entities taking over but certainly certain focal points of what matters that create distinct modes of behavior. Do you think it's more likely that there is some kind of mysterious entity that chooses between conflicting choices or that our choices are just products of which focal point happens to win out? What would it mean to make a choice if there were not conflicting benefits? Surely by definition there must be conflicting parts for a choice to be made. Well there must be alternative potentials of action for a choice to be made, but how do you know which one of the conflicting desires, if there are any, is "your" desire? So by freedom you essentially seem to mean a dualistic conception of the soul; a bundle of uncaused actions. I don't find it very concerning that such a thing doesn't seem to exist... of course, everything we do is the result of what went before. Action wouldn't make much sense otherwise. I'm not sure what I mean by freedom. It would make more sense to me if the agent who we defined as us had one, decisive course of action in mind to be free from the influence of conflicting desires, but this doesn't seem to be the case considering the whole picture of a person who is undecided.

[Original Poster]

Will is the reduction of dissonance in the brain.

[Original Poster]

What's not to get? All desires come down to genetic and environmental conditioning causing the release of either serotonin or dopamine.

[Original Poster]

That's easy. We are motivated to reduce suffering in the mind and body. We have a cognition capable of processing information and churning out the conclusion that such peace is possible. We naturally desire it. (Of course that also brings into the game the paradoxical obstacle of desiring peace utilizing the very attitude that causes suffering in the first place)

[Wayfaerer]

The desire for comfort? You could also speculate about the Freudian concept of "Thanatos".

[Carrot]

But why would the desires from a biological evolution not be anything we truly want? What about the action of not thinking too much into matters? You know there are a lot of happy go lucky people in this world.

[Original Poster]

But why would the desires from a biological evolution not be anything we truly want? What about the action of not thinking too much into matters? You know there are a lot of happy go lucky people in this world. A major factor of evolution is variation. We can't all act the same way, it's not feasible. In some way or another we're all experiments being tested for viability. Some people are more easy going, or ignorantly blissful, others churn over ideas over and over again. This is not because they willed to be that way, they are blooming into the creation they were encoded to become.

[Wayfaerer]

But why would the desires from a biological evolution not be anything we truly want? This is my point exactly, there's nothing between us and what biological evolution did/does, so there's no need for a "chooser" that isn't just the mechanical-like interactions of biological drives and psychological drives that stem from them. what about the action of not thinking too much into matters? This is kind of my point also, more so why think too much about matters that make no sense? lol

[Carrot]

This is my point exactly, there's nothing between us and what biological evolution did/does, so there's no need for a "chooser" that isn't just the mechanical-like interactions of biological drives and psychological drives that stem from them. This is kind of my point also, more so why think too much about matters that make no sense? lol If you're putting it that way, then I don't think it's entirely desires from our biological evolution. You don't need to make sense of things to survive, you're doing it purely for yourself.

[Chimpertainment]

Freewill I invoke the power of the wiki.... Free will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The existence of free will and its exact nature and definition have long been debated in philosophy. Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been the metaphysical constraint of determinism. The question seems to me to be, does choice still stand against the inevitable control of nature. All things are made from the inherent chaos of nature and yet there is majestic order produced from that chaos. Like Tron; when the variables which compose reality's description reaches a tipping point, the reality begins to create itself. The reality in a sense becomes self aware. That is us by the way. By becoming aware, we can actual self determine our actions because we can understand how the choice is being made. Everyone has a sort of way of making a choice. The person usually believes this is the best course of action they can take. It isnt necessarily just action that produces freewill but the understanding any associated parties might have of the nature of that action. In doing this, they are acting in a way that separates themselves from others' actions. Perhaps they will make the same choice, but the way in which they choose will be different. Freewill as a human is about listening to the voices and making your own.

[Original Poster]

But that awareness developed as an umbrella consciousness, and is not something different from the various conditions it is aware of. So it goes back to what I first said. Will is the reduction of dissonance in the brain. Our gestalt mind can weigh two conflicting impulses that could not previously be compared. But does a process of reducing dissonance really imply choice, on any level?

[Chimpertainment]

The awareness develops difference because of its ability to choose. The ability to choose arises from the awareness. Will must have a point of focus. The resolution of dissonance precedes any conclusion or force of will.

[Original Poster]

The awareness develops difference because of its ability to choose. The ability to choose arises from the awareness. Will must have a point of focus. The resolution of dissonance precedes any conclusion or force of will. I don't understand. Could you elaborate?

[Chimpertainment]

Choice implies will. We want to go somewhere and we choose to act in order to fulfill that desire. The choice is a specific portion of the exertion of will. Choice is the conclusion of will. Will is produced by what you refer to as resolution of dissonance. I would say this resolution is the process by which we identify the properties of reality. This fundamental function precedes any force of will or active choice/conclusion. Of course, past choices influence this resolution of dissonance yet future choice can be unfettered by previously held assumptions. This is the process by which awareness is formed.