Thread: How are we not a computer?

Originally Posted by tkdyo

would the conciousness it gains be a clone, or could my original conciousness somehow be transfered?

Neither, the apparent uniqueness of your consciousness is most likely an illusion.

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

Neither, the apparent uniqueness of your consciousness is most likely an illusion.

...Im not sure what you mean by this...how is it an illusion?

Edit: Soros, that is a very interesting concept. I wonder if that could truly work, or as Bonsay has said, it just blurrs the line.

Originally Posted by tkdyo

...Im not sure what you mean by this...how is it an illusion?

There's nothing inherently special about the matter that constitutes you: replacing you with an exact copy or not would makes difference physically, there's nothing to make us think the replacement would be different in any way at all. But it also makes no sense to think that some objective form of consciousness would be "preserved" because there's no connection between the original and the copy. The answer, I think, is that consciousness is a subjective attribute rather than an individual objective thing.

(A good analogy would be the Sun and it's gravitational field: if we replaced the Sun with an exact copy, we wouldn't say the Earth was now being kept in orbit by a "different" or "new" gravity, it's just gravity.)


I think Bonsay explained it better.

ok, I know what you mean now, and I agree of course that nothing is different physically...this is what I was trying to get at with the question though. Since conciousness is a subjective experience...it makes me wonder if actual transfer of the me I experience right now is possible...I feel rather the current me would stop experiencing anything and die and a new physically Identcal me would take its place. despite all the memories being transplanted, the original me still in the body would cease to experience anything so it would be the same as dieing.

There's nothing inherently special about the matter that constitutes you: replacing you with an exact copy or not would makes difference physically, there's nothing to make us think the replacement would be different in any way at all. But it also makes no sense to think that some objective form of consciousness would be "preserved" because there's no connection between the original and the copy. The answer, I think, is that consciousness is a subjective attribute rather than an individual objective thing.

I find this problem fascinating.

I'd disagree that the copy definitely wouldn't be 'your' consciousness. It's clear that the causality of neural activity is what causes consciousness, but this seems to jar very much with reductionism in which there isn't really any objective reality to 'causes' and 'events'. The point is that from 'scanning the brain' to 'building the brain' there is a clear causal pathway which you might think consciousness would travel down.

However when we consider what would happen when we made say, 10 different copies of you, it becomes clear that there is a problem.

However, I definitely don't think the solution to the hard problem is to deny the uniqueness of consciousness. I think it's an extremely patent fact, pretty much as patent as can possibly be, that our consciousness is a single thing with a single us associated with it.

Originally Posted by Xei

However, I definitely don't think the solution to the hard problem is to deny the uniqueness of consciousness. I think it's an extremely patent fact, pretty much as patent as can possibly be, that our consciousness is a single thing with a single us associated with it.

But if we look at us existing in time as existing in different copies, there are basically an infinite amount of copies in a certain time frame (If a moment in time is infinitely small). So how will you pinpoint something unique, which can be recognised as consciousness only when it's active, thus requiring time to function... so if we agree that different "brainstates" coencide with different "consciousness's" there is never a real "you" to associate with.

I don't really understand what you mean.

In the causality model there has only ever been one you. Your neurons don't interfere with the neurons in somebody else's head. You're a single closed system, and hence a single consciousness.

Originally Posted by tkdyo

ok, I know what you mean now, and I agree of course that nothing is different physically...this is what I was trying to get at with the question though. Since conciousness is a subjective experience...it makes me wonder if actual transfer of the me I experience right now is possible...I feel rather the current me would stop experiencing anything and die and a new physically Identcal me would take its place. despite all the memories being transplanted, the original me still in the body would cease to experience anything so it would be the same as dieing.

That's not what I was trying to say. I meant there is no transferring of your 'consciousness' to the copy because there's nothing to be transferred.

Originally Posted by Xei

I find this problem fascinating.

I'd disagree that the copy definitely wouldn't be 'your' consciousness. It's clear that the causality of neural activity is what causes consciousness, but this seems to jar very much with reductionism in which there isn't really any objective reality to 'causes' and 'events'. The point is that from 'scanning the brain' to 'building the brain' there is a clear causal pathway which you might think consciousness would travel down.

However when we consider what would happen when we made say, 10 different copies of you, it becomes clear that there is a problem.

However, I definitely don't think the solution to the hard problem is to deny the uniqueness of consciousness. I think it's an extremely patent fact, pretty much as patent as can possibly be, that our consciousness is a single thing with a single us associated with it.

How do you think scenarios like making 10 copies could be explained with consciousness being objective and unique? It's physically contradictory. The only way I can see it working is if we discovered the existence of souls.

Also as Bonsay mentioned we're always constantly and gradually changing over time into completely different persons. Pretty much like species in an evolutionary line, you can't pinpoint a moment when a past 'you' disappeared and a new 'you' popped into existence.

I'm refering to the changes that happen in the brain all the time. How many changes does a brain need to stop being "you"? A lobotomy? A simple new memory formation...? That's what I meant that "you" changes all the time.

Well, taking 'you' to mean a single conscious system, clearly from experience the latter does not change who you are. Lobotomy patients... impossible to know I suppose.

How do you think scenarios like making 10 copies could be explained with consciousness being objective and unique? It's physically contradictory. The only way I can see it working is if we discovered the existence of souls.

Also as Bonsay mentioned we're always constantly and gradually changing over time into completely different persons. Pretty much like species in an evolutionary line, you can't pinpoint a moment when a past 'you' disappeared and a new 'you' popped into existence.

Like I said, under my definition there has only ever been one 'you'.

I recognise the contradiction, but I also recognise based on empirical evidence that I have only ever been me.

Denying your own existence gets rid of some of the paradoxes but is empirically untenable. I'm sure there is a solution, we just haven't found it, or possibly can't find it.

Originally Posted by Scatterbrain

That's not what I was trying to say. I meant there is no transferring of your 'consciousness' to the copy because there's nothing to be transferred.

oh ok, but why is that if consciousness just arises out of our physical processes?