Thread: Gavin's Workbook

It is crucial to recognize the impotence of a strictly electoral-based strategy for triggering significant change in a nation state, and thus it is imperative that we refrain from concluding that the passing of the torch from Stephen Harper to Justin Trudeau will, in and of itself, mark a new era in Canadian politics. While its supporters argue that the current party in power can be expected to set Canada on a bold new path, critics maintain that simply swapping out government officials is not sufficient for transforming a society - these politicians must not only be enticed into adopting progressive positions, but also pressured into enacting complimentary legislation in a timely manner. While the ideological rigidity of Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party hampered the efforts of progressives under the last administration, the Liberal Party, due to its preference for brokerage politics, is more responsive to majority sentiments and thus more readily manoeuvred into giving up political concessions to detractors of the status quo should they levy a sufficient challenge to the legitimacy of the party. With this in mind, progressives are tasked with engaging in greater political agitation under the current administration than under the last.

Throughout the election period, the Liberal Party campaigned on the concept of "real change." Under the leadership of Justin Trudeau, it assured Canadians that it would lead the nation in a new direction, one which promised a respite from the politics of fear and division which characterized the Conservative Party with Stephen Harper at its helm. By positioning itself as a party for those committed to positive progressive politics, and rallying much of the citizenry around its charismatic leader and his "ambitious" platform, the Liberal Party managed to secure a majority win on election day. Progressives should be content, one would assume, by this turn of events, for this party stands for those issues, takes those positions, that were oft neglected by the last administration. It was, after all, the unwillingness, on the part of the Conservative government, to entertain proposals that did not fall in line with its neo-conservative values, that served as the primary source of discontent for those who grew increasingly critical of the status quo. In light of this, Liberal supporters view the direction the party has taken as an indication of its progressive, forward-thinking nature and maintain that the party should be given a chance to follow through with its agenda undeterred if Canada is to be radically transformed for the better.

which were so characteristic of Stephen Harper's Conservative government. and suggest that the party be given the chance to implement its agenda

But unlike those with more bourgeois sensibilities, many others have not been swept away in the so-called "Red Tide" and remain skeptical of the party’s ability to bring “real change” to Canada. Although there is a consensus that the Liberal party will be more representative of the public will than the last administration, it would be naive - politically naive - to confuse a simple shuffling of MP's with a new era in Canadian politics. Critics would counter that the Liberal Party's willingness to take the aforementioned positions can be better attributed to its preference for what is referred to as “brokerage politics,” rather than any inherent affinity with enlightened ideals. According to political scientist Rand Dyck, a broker party can best be described as one which attempts to capitalize on the numerous cleavages in a society and aims to "aggregate [these diverse] interests" into a single platform. Pressing further, he states that these parties aim to maximize their appeal among as many groups as possible, and view themselves as the chief mediators between the conflicting interests of these collectives. Proponents of broker politics claim that, not only is this strategy effective in terms of amassing power, it is also instrumental in keeping a nation together. In short, Dyck concludes that such parties strive to "reconcile as many divergent interests as possible" in an attempt to "act as agents of national integration." It is in his opinion that the Liberal Party of Canada is a prime example of a brokerage party. It is important to note, however, that despite the apparent practicality of this approach to politics, the broker party system is not without its flaws. This readiness to conciliate, for example, comes at the expense of ideological depth and a consistency in principles. Accordingly, Dyck regards such parties as "opportunistic," claiming that they are prone to resorting to short-term pragmatism when faced with political dilemmas rather than striving for “innovative policy approaches” which lead to “genuinely distinctive programs” or “alternative solutions to national problems.” (textbook, p. 212-213) In other words, these parties are keenly attuned to the opinions of the majority, and are capable of offering compromises to the minority, but are risk-averse and thus slow in breaking new ground in the field of politics. It is precisely because of these reasons, critics contend, that the Liberal Party cannot reasonably be expected to take serious progressive steps during its term unless it is either pressured to or sees a reward - in the form of electoral support - for doing so.

The fear of political backlash from reactionaries discourages many major political parties in general, and those guided by broker politics in particular, from taking unconventional positions on public matters. As a result, voters are presented with campaign platforms that are lacking in diversity and distinction - platforms that may be palatable to moderates, but which fail to account for and represent the sentiments of the more polarized citizens. If progressives are to counteract the stifling effects that this shared timidity, on the part of our political leaders, has on citizens who hold avant-garde positions, they must develop a means of overshadowing the degree of influence that reactionaries currently exert on our political system. I propose that with the unification of progressives into a distinct collective, one with the capacity to generate enough political agitation to capture the attention and support of larger segments of the population, it is possible to incentivise alternative or forward-thinking positions amongst the elected office holders - thereby increasing their likelihood of supporting avant-garde proposals. In short, it would be advantageous for progressives to mobilize in a fashion that pressures elected officials into incorporating more nuanced perspectives into their platforms; either by making it "politically profitable" for them to support progressive measures, or by making it too costly to resist them.

On the question of how this is to be done, a great deal of disagreement can be expected from opposing camps - we must not hesitate to consider each of the various perspectives on the matter, no matter how unconventional. Conventional wisdom would suggest traditional electoral practices, strikes, or mass demonstrations. But protests have become commonplace, their efficacy is questionable. [examples of Canadian protests] If they are to be effective, such tactics must be employed in the context of a broader strategy - an overarching plan of coordinated actions which aim to define the relationship and dominate the power-dynamic between the opposing parties. The need for a more strategic system of operations designed to connect and reinforce the efforts of disparate agitators, on the part of progressives in their pursuit of political interests, cannot be overlooked. In the realm of politics, power flows from organization. The degree to which a given collective is able to affect the actions of the state - or more generally, its ability to sway public opinion - is positively correlated with its ability to maximize the utility of its resources while minimizing the costs, be they material or otherwise. In the midst of political conflicts, the side that is better able to organize itself and coordinate its activities in a more sophisticated manner is able to mount a more concentrated offensive against its opponent. This is a key point that progressives must keep in mind if they are to develop a political instrument capable of punitive action in response to unwelcome legislation.

It stands to reason then, that the progressive bloc should prioritize the establishment of a set of practices that will enhance its organizational capacity - thereby providing the means of positioning political parties between the horns of a dilemma: either A) backing progressive proposals in the hopes of securing support from a sizeable demographic, or B) resisting progressive measures and facing backlash as a result, ultimately pressuring them into making political concessions out of necessity. Marxist-Leninists may suggest that one potential catalyst for triggering rapid advancements on this front could be the emergence of a cadre of agitators devoted to this very task. They would contend that this course of action is supported by the theory put forth by Vladimir Lenin in his essay "Where to Begin?”, in which he recognizes the utmost importance of organization in political struggle, and thus urges dissidents to seize the initiative and organize themselves into an elite force that is able intensify the progressive struggle against the old order. Upon further examination of this work, we find that Lenin claims that the building of "an organisation of struggle and of political agitation among the masses" is vital during times of peace, for it would be too late to form such an organization during a time of political upheaval (citation). In other words, in Lenin’s view, it is absolutely necessary that an organization that is well-versed in the methods of political agitation be ready to engage in such activities at the most opportune of times - in anticipation for the next mass action. Continuing, Lenin adds that " the immediate task of our Party is… to call for the formation of a revolutionary organisation capable of uniting all forces and guiding the movement in actual practice and not in name alone, that is, an organisation ready at any time to support every protest and every outbreak and use it to build up and consolidate the fighting forces suitable for the decisive struggle.” In concluding his essay, Lenin seeks to avoid misinterpretation by clarifying that his emphasis on the importance of organization should not be misconstrued as a rejection of the plausibility of spontaneous uprisings. On the contrary, he reminds, the historical record would indicate that autocratic regimes are liable to fall under the weight of such unforeseen upheavals. But, Lenin argues, it would be unwise for a "political party" to coordinate its "activities on the anticipation of such outbursts and complications."

Proponents of this model argue that… - Taking note of recent appeals to the use of terror as a means of political agitation, without entirely ruling it out as a means of struggle, Lenin concludes that it would be unsustainable and thus an inappropriate tactic given the fragmented nature of disparate local revolutionary groups. As such, Lenin declares, such a method of protest distracts revolutionaries from the real task of the movement. Ultimately, it destablizes the movement more so than the power-structure. Referring to recent events, Lenin points out how the masses "pressed forward in struggle, while the revolutionaries lacked a staff of leaders and organizers." If this continues, he contends, the capacity of the masses to engage in meaningful agitation will be proportionally weakened as more revolutionaries disconnect from the mass struggle and go the way of terror instead- a path that will ultimately lead to further isolation from the whole of the movement. - Lenin contends that the most important step that can be taken in the formulative stages of the "desired organization" is the "founding of an All-Russian political newspaper." The publication would "develop, deepen, and extend that organization" by serving as a tool for disseminating the key ideas which will coordinate the propaganda and agitation of the movement at this key juncture when "interest in politics and socialism has been aroused among the broadest strata of the population." Lenin argues that it if the movement is unable to do even this, it would be naive to think that it can employ more "complex" means for "exerting influence." Given that the majority of Social-Democrats are primarily occupied with local work, their capacity to theorize solutions/aid in the organization of the larger movement is reduced, and the movements suffers from ideological and organization stagnation as a result. It is this complication that Lenin hopes to resolve by founding an All-Russian newspaper - an instrument for unifying otherwise disjointed local organizations in both theory and practice.

It was these same sentiments that Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale later echoed when they formed the Black Panther Party, an organization whose activities serve as evidence of the efficacy of such an approach. Despite its inception as a small local community group devised as a means of combating the malpractice and malfeasance of the corrupt local authorities, the ingenuity behind this organization captured the attention and pricked the imagination of the larger society - inspiring many Black dissidents to mirror these tactics and open various chapters throughout the nation. In spite of its relatively small size, its organization capacity enabled it to sustain a prolonged campaign against the practices of the state. [elaborate on impact, authors' conclusion that no "revolutionary" organization has managed to do what the BPP managed to do since]

Originally Posted by Newbie

Moderates may question the necessity of such a strategy, but progressive clarify that it is not so much a question of necessity, but rather, whether it would be advantageous to organize in such a manner. Further strengthening their case, progressives remind how easily the C-51 protests were overlooked and dismissed. It may be argued that perhaps such demonstrations would not be so easily dismissed if they had greater support, but one only has to look to the results of the Occupy mobilization to recognize the fallacy of this argument. Despite having near-universal appeal, the Occupy protests were relegated to [x] and eventually dispersed.

[How easily the C-51 protests were overlooked and dismissed]
eg. brief summary of news article about protests, quote from book pointing out how the bill was still passed

[Optional: These kinds of protests could just as easily have been ignored if even they had received larger support (eg. Occupy).]

Originally Posted by Newbie

Perhaps the efforts of activists to resist regressive measures such as Bill C-10, Bill C-24, Bill C-51, etc. would have been made more effective - and more difficult to ignore - had they been coordinated with, and amplified by, the presence of a leading political organization which embodied the counter-ideology of these critics of the status quo. While the election resulted in a change in government, one that is more liberal than the last, the new party in power fails to instill confidence in progressives who wish for an [activist-government]. It does not seem that the current party is any more inclined to take bold, progressive steps than the last, at least not on it's own accord. Given the Liberal Party's preference for brokerage politics, perhaps the efforts of activists to challenge regressive measures such as Bill C-10, Bill C-24, Bill C-51, etc. would be made more effective - and more difficult to ignore - if coordinated with, and amplified by, the presence of a leading political organization which can levy greater criticisms of current laws and political practices than a divided [body of dissidents]. With the capacity to better polarize the public, this organization could theoretically incentivise previously unconventional political positions on matters. A leading organization can provide the the structure that is needed to sustain a prolonged campaign of protest.

[A leading organization could provide the structure that is needed to sustain a prolonged action/mobilization/campaign/protest.]

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