From Universal Mind
The costs would be so high, as they presently are. War is very serious stuff. Cheney showed in an interview back then that they understood exactly what would happen. Cheney fully saw the picture that would happen. It was enough then to make them refrain. But 9/11 illustrated the seriousness and urgency of dealing with our terrorism threats, and that created the difference in the cost/benefit analysis.
If they knew what the difficulties were going to be, they did a very poor job of preparing for them, and an even worse job of informing the public. I have never heard anyone from the administration claim that a coherent post-war plan was ready to be implemented when Saddam was deposed. Rather, the plan formulated by the State Dept. was rejected, and no alternative was provided. Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, said that the insurgency wouldn't last more than a few months, and Cheney himself said long ago that the insurgency was in its last throes.
There are three scenarios that come to mind to explain this:
1) The proponents of the war had a post-war plan, but implemented it poorly and were too incompetent to accurately judge the situation.
2) The proponents of the war had a post-war plan, but implemented it poorly and lied about its effectiveness to cover themselves.
3) The proponents of the war had no post-war plan, and initiated war while fantasizing that nothing was necessary beyond deposing Saddam.
Are there any scenarios I'm missing? What explains the degree to which the military and the administration were unprepared to deal with conditions in Iraq? This article is a little old, but relevant nonetheless:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/...778139,00.html
General Shinseki testified before congress that the war would need far more troops for a longer period than the administration was suggesting. He was subsequently pressured to retire early.
What evidence is there that a realistic post-war plan was available?
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